This book provides an understanding of corporate governance in the context of Thailand. It explains the background and scope of corporate governance in Thailand before and after the Asian financial crisis, and details the roles of the relevant agencies and the key elements of corporate governance for listed companies. The author reviews the assessments made by both local and international organizations and concludes by looking at the challenges ahead and offering policy recommendations for raising the level of corporate governance in Thailand.

Thailand's currency crisis set off a national and regional economic meltdown in the closing years of the twentieth century. Written by Thai economists, this book gives a progress report on good corporate governance practices in listed non-financial companies, financial institutions, state-owned enterprises, and non-listed companies in Thailand.

November 1998 Weaknesses in corporate governance and the fragile financial structure of many corporations contributed to, and deepened Thailand's recent financial crisis. Large corporations need to reduce their vulnerability to economic shocks and improve corporate governance; smaller firms should achieve a more stable funding structure. Alba, Claessens, and Djankov assess Thailand's policy options for reducing large corporations' vulnerability to economic shocks and improving their corporate governance - and for providing smaller firms a more stable funding structure. Using data for firms listed on Thailand's stock exchange, they empirically assess the relative importance of various factors determining the cost of capital, the availability of financing, and policies and distortions that affect corporate governance in nonfinancial firms. The empirical findings highlight weaknesses in corporate governance and the inherent risks in Thailand's corporate financing structures. They conclude that the most important ask in improving the structure of corporate financing and the framework for corporate governance is to change incentives. This will involve: * Accelerating legal reform, including reform of bankruptcy and foreclosure laws. * Improving bank monitoring of enterprise management and encouraging banks to develop more arm's-length relationships with firms. This will require greater transparency and disclosure of ownership relationships and stricter enforcement of insider and related lending limits, violation of which contributed poor intermediation and the recent crisis. * Improving disclosure and accounting practices. Self-regulatory agencies may need to play more of a role, possibly with more legal power to discipline violators. * Better enforcement of corporate governance rules. The formal structure for corporate governance is standard but enforcement is weak. * Facilitation of equity infusions. Investors - especially minority shareholders - may need to play a more direct role in monitoring and disciplining managers. To attract new infusions of equity, new equity owners may need more-than-proportional representation on the board of directors until other investor protection mechanisms are strengthened. * Improving the framework for corporate governance. A broad public discussion of corporate governance, similar to recent discussions in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, may be needed to clarify the distribution of control in the economy's real sector. * Strengthening institutions responsible for gathering and analyzing data on firms of all sizes and for monitoring firm performance and behavior. This paper-a product of the Economic Policy Unit, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Network-is part of a larger effort in the network to study the performance and financing structures of East Asian corporations.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had identified various corporate governance challenges in Asia, the most serious of these being the expropriation of minority shareholders. Since the 1997 Asian economic crisis, minority shareholder protection has become an area for focus as part of the overall movement to improve corporate governance of public listed companies in Thailand. The Stock Exchange of Thailand estimated that it has about nine million investors, directly and indirectly. A majority of these are minority shareholders who, left on their own accord, have little competitive advantage against controlling shareholders and their nominated corporate insiders. This study examines the protection of minority shareholders in public listed companies in Thailand by conducting a survey on a sample of 150 minority shareholders in order to derive recommendations for improvement of their protection.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the variation of the corporate governance mechanisms which effects on the operational performance of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). The qualitative research methods were used to collect data and used the Panel Data Random Effects to analyze data. The research sampling was selected from the listed Companies in the SET, recorded during 2011-2015. The selected 1,665 listed Companies were used to analyze the impact of the corporate governance. The research results found that corporate governance mechanism, CEO Duality and the number of board meeting held the significant negative impacts on the operational performance of listed companies in the SET. Whereas the board size and the board independence have no significant impacts on the operational performance of listed companies in the SET.