This paper examines the relation between the disclosure practices of firms, the number of analysts following each firm, and properties of the analysts' earnings forecasts. Using data from the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee Report (FAF Report), we provide evidence that firms with more informative disclosure policies have a larger analyst following, more accurate analyst earnings forecasts, less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions. The results enhance our understanding of the role of analysts in capital markets. Further, they suggest that potential benefits to disclosure include increased investor following, reduced estimation risk and reduced information asymmetry, each of which have been shown to reduce a firm's cost of capital in theoretical research.

Informal Corporate Disclosure Under Federal Securities Law, 2009 Editionexamines the regulation of informal disclosure -- e.g., press releases,speeches, analyst conference calls, webcasts, and investor roadshows -- asdistinguished from formal, highly structured disclosure in SEC filings. Thecoverage includes discussion of federal securities law, rules and courtdecisions; self-regulatory organization rules for listed companies, andstandards of practice prescribed by the National Investor RelationsInstitute (NIRI).This updated 2009 Edition includes:discussion of the SEC's recent guidance on the use of company web sites,including advice on the sufficiency of web site disclosure as a means ofdissemination under Regulation FD (see ¶1002)liability for hyperlinks to third-party information (see ¶1003)issues presented by the use of summaries and overviews (see ¶1004)concerns related to blogs and online discussion forums (see ¶1009)The new 2009 Edition also examines materiality principlesgoverning quantitative financial disclosures, specifically the recommendationsof the SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting,or CIFiR (see ¶¶403 and 1102). In addition, the work covers recentSEC Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations on the Form 8-K reportingobligation triggered by disclosure of certain financial information (see¶1105). Finally, the 2009 Edition includes discussion ofnew NIRI standards for quarterly earnings releases (see ¶1103), thetext of selected portions of those standards (see Appendix), and a timelinefor preparing an earnings release (see Appendix).

The Regulation of Corporate Disclosure, Third Edition is a complete and up-to-date handbook on the issue of corporate disclosure, covering the impact of the federal securities laws on both informal communications and the process of communicating with shareholders. The Third Edition expands topics previously covered, addressing the legal issues and practical concerns surrounding implementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The book also has an in-depth treatment of managementand’s discussion and analysis (MDand&A), something that, although appearing in required SEC filings, involves many of the same difficult and complex issues raised by the informal disclosure process. Also addressed are: SEC reforms of the periodic reporting process; issues pertaining to stock research analysts and conflicts of interest; and various relevant corporate governance requirements and their disclosure implications. Critical areas analyzed include ;Disclosure requirements and anti-fraud provisions The duty to disclose Dissemination Issues involving materiality Disclosure of bad news Negotiations Dealing with analysts And much more!

This study examines how the quality of corporate disclosures impacts the precision of information that financial analysts incorporate into their forecasts of upcoming annual earnings. Our empirical measures distinguish between the precision of individual analysts' common and idiosyncratic (private) information, and between the quality of firms' public disclosures and private communications with analysts. We find that higher quality disclosures increase the precision of individual analysts' common and idiosyncratic information. These findings are due to higher quality annual and quarterly accounting disclosures. In contrast, we find no evidence that the quality of private communications between analysts and management affects the precision of analysts' common or idiosyncratic information.