The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, adopted by OSCE member states during the Budapest Summit of December 1994, has become a significant addition to the range of politically binding documents of the OSCE. The Code, besides referring to internationally legally binding provisions for the conduct of politico-military affairs, codifies some of the existing norms on the democratic control and use of armed forces for interstate and intrastate purposes. It also lays down guidelines for the personal responsibility and accountability of the individual members of these armed forces. Moreover, this latest product of OSCE norm setting aims at becoming a valuable and effective instrument for the prevention of armed conflict. The significance, validity, and virtues of the Code are critically examined in this work. It is based on a seminar which was sponsored by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Germany and the Netherlands, and organized by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, in cooperation with the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. The book introduces the Code as a whole and deals with experiences from the negotiating table. It links the Code with international law and evaluates the Code on its early warning and conflict prevention merits. The work also investigates the connections between the Code and civil-military relations in the cases of Poland, the Russian Federation, and Germany and charts the way ahead for implementation of the Code. Finally, the Editor summarizes the main conclusions and highlights of the debate.

The book represents an urgently needed reference work on both the contents and the impact of the Code; drawing on as-yet unpublished materials, it offers a paragraph-by-paragraph commentary on the Code, as well as an in-depth assessment of implementation trends in the OSCE region.

The end of the Cold War has changed the shape of organized violence in the world and the ways in which governments and others try to set its limits. Even the concept of international conflict is broadening to include ethnic conflicts and other kinds of violence within national borders that may affect international peace and security. What is not yet clear is whether or how these changes alter the way actors on the world scene should deal with conflict: Do the old methods still work? Are there new tools that could work better? How do old and new methods relate to each other? International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War critically examines evidence on the effectiveness of a dozen approaches to managing or resolving conflict in the world to develop insights for conflict resolution practitioners. It considers recent applications of familiar conflict management strategies, such as the use of threats of force, economic sanctions, and negotiation. It presents the first systematic assessments of the usefulness of some less familiar approaches to conflict resolution, including truth commissions, "engineered" electoral systems, autonomy arrangements, and regional organizations. It also opens up analysis of emerging issues, such as the dilemmas facing humanitarian organizations in complex emergencies. This book offers numerous practical insights and raises key questions for research on conflict resolution in a transforming world system.

In this book the social scientist and economist Professor Dr. Raymond Saner draws on his long years of experience as a negotiation adviser, teacher, trainer, researcher and university lecturer to show that two thirds of negotiation practice is learnable. The author treats the different aspects of negotiation practice in a way that is useful to both academics and practitioners, such that the general laws and principles gradually become evident as and of themselves.

Six cases of US intervention are highlighted - Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Nicaragua in 1985, and Panama in 1989. In each case the US violated international law and the sovereignty of the states involved, but claimed it had a right to intervene to protect the lives of its nationals or to defend its national security against an external threat. These cases amply demonstrate the conflict between international law on the one hand, and regional norms, power politics and political doctrines on the other. They also illustrate how international law can be manipulated to advance the foreign policy goals of a major power.

The US administration's pursuit in Afghanistan of the terrorists responsible for the September 11th attacks was supported by an international coalition and backed by the legal authority of the UN Security Council Resolutions.