How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

A thought provoking essay on the possible implications of irregular warfare in national military strategy.

Important military lessons for fighting today's insurgency in Iraq

By focusing on four specific hotbeds of instability-Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq-Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew carefully analyze tribal culture and clan associations, examine why "traditional" or "tribal" warriors fight, identify how these groups recruit, and where they find sanctuary, and dissect the reasoning behind their strategy. Their new introduction evaluates recent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the growing prevalence of Shultz and Dew's conception of irregular warfare, and the Obama Defense Department's approach to fighting insurgents, terrorists, and militias. War in the post-Cold War era cannot be waged through traditional Western methods of combat, especially when friendly states and outside organizations like al-Qaeda serve as powerful allies to the enemy. Bridging two centuries and several continents, Shultz and Dew recommend how conventional militaries can defeat these irregular yet highly effective organizations.

Product Description: Since the tragic events of 9/11 and the consequent advent of the Global War on Terrorism, there has been a remarkable surge of interest in counterinsurgency. This anthology presents 27 articles on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, particularly highlighting and examining the U.S. Marine Corps' roles in conflicts from 1898 through 2007. It also includes an extensive bibliography of works on these conflicts. Continuing discussion and study of these subjects is of critical importance to the ongoing efforts of the United States and its allies in the Global War on Terrorism. The anthology is divided broadly into two halves: the first half presents historical examples of counterinsurgency involving the United States-from the Philippines and the "Banana Wars" up through Vietnam-while the second half addresses the nation's contemporary efforts in this regard. Articles cover the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The selected bibliography addresses a broad range of subjects: on higher-end operational/strategic level of war considerations, on geopolitical context, and on a varied array of related topics-political theory, historical case studies, failed states, cultural studies and analysis, and many others-that all provide context or play a role in conducting a counterinsurgency and achieving success in the realm of irregular warfare. Colonel Stephen S. Evans, USMCR, researched and compiled this work as a field historian with the Marine Corps History Division. He has experience at various operational levels, both joint and multinational, in CONUS and overseas, and has performed duty with all three MEFs, MARFORLANT, MARFOREUR, and U.S. forces in Korea. He has also held a range of positions in administrative and educational roles at Quantico and the Pentagon. Colonel Evans holds a doctorate in history from Temple University and has published two historical monographs.

Two years before the action in Lone Survivor, a team of Green Berets conducted a very different, successful mission in Afghanistan's notorious Pech Valley. Led by Captain Ronald Fry, Hammerhead Six applied the principles of unconventional warfare to "win hearts and minds" and fight against the terrorist insurgency. In 2003, the Special Forces soldiers entered an area later called "the most dangerous place in Afghanistan." Here, where the line between civilians and armed zealots was indistinct, they illustrated the Afghan proverb: "I destroy my enemy by making him my friend." Fry recounts how they were seen as welcome guests rather than invaders. Soon after their deployment ended, the Pech Valley reverted to turmoil. Their success was never replicated. Hammerhead Six finally reveals how cultural respect, hard work (and the occasional machine-gun burst) were more than a match for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

This volume addresses the problem of small, irregular, and unconventional war across time and around the globe. The use of non-uniformed and often civilian combatants, with tactics eschewing pitched battles, is the most common form of warfare throughout history and comes in many forms. The collection works back in time beginning with the ‘Long War’ in present day Afghanistan and concluding with warfare in classical Greece. Along the way it engages with conflicts as diverse as the American Civil War and regional rebellion in Tudor England. Each case study provides unique insights into the practices, experiences, and discourses that have shaped this ubiquitous type of conflict. Readers interested in rebellion and repression, cultural and tactical interpretations of conflict, civilian strategies in wartime, the supposed ‘western way of war’, and the ways in which participants have framed and related their actions across a variety of spheres will find much of interest in these pages.