Analyzes the differences in the approach to Soviet trade between the US and Germany since 1917. It provides an historical perpective to the use of Western economic power as an instrument with which to change Soviet policy. The book relates economic policy to political strategy.

This well-researched book details the ambiguity in British policy towards Europe in the Cold War as it sought to pursue détente with the Soviet Union whilst upholding its commitments to its NATO allies. From the early 1950s, Britain pursued a dual policy of strengthening the West whilst seeking détente with the Soviet Union. British statesmen realized that only through compromise with Moscow over the German question could the elusive East-West be achieved. Against this, the West German hard line towards the East (endorsed by the United States) was seen by the British as perpetuating tension between the two blocs. This cast British policy onto an insoluble dilemma, as it was caught between its alliance obligations to the West German state and its search for compromise with the Soviet bloc. Charting Britain's attempts to reconcile this contradiction, this book argues that Britain successfully adapted to the new realities and made hitherto unknown contributions towards détente in the early 1960s, whilst drawing towards Western Europe and applying for membership of the EEC in 1961. Drawing on unpublished US and UK archives, Britain, Germany and the Cold War casts new light on the Cold War, the history of détente and the evolution of European integration. This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, British foreign policy, German politics, and international history.

1968: The World Transformed presents a global perspective on the tumultuous events of the most crucial year in the era of the Cold War. By interpreting 1968 as a transnational phenomenon, authors from Europe and the United States explain why the crises of 1968 erupted almost simultaneously throughout the world. Together, the eighteen chapters provide an interdisciplinary and comparative approach to the rise and fall of protest movements worldwide. The book represents an effort to integrate international relations, the role of media, and the cross-cultural exchange of people and ideas into the history of that year. 1968 emerges as a global phenomenon because of the linkages between domestic and international affairs, the powerful influence of the media, the networks of communication among activists, and the shared opposition to the domestic and international status quo in the name of freedom and self-determination.

Publisher Description

Despite the consensus that economic diplomacy played a crucial role in ending the Cold War, very little research has been done on the economic diplomacy during the crucial decades of the 1970s and 1980s. This book fills the gap by exploring the complex interweaving of East–West political and economic diplomacies in the pursuit of détente. The focus on German chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik reveals how its success was rooted in the usage of energy trade and high tech exchanges with the Soviet Union. His policies and visions are contrasted with those of U.S. President Richard Nixon and the Realpolitik of Henry Kissinger. The ultimate failure to coordinate these rivaling détente policies, and the resulting divide on how to deal with the Soviet Union, left NATO with an energy dilemma between American and European partners—one that has resurfaced in the 21st century with Russia’s politicization of energy trade. This book is essential for anyone interested in exploring the interface of international diplomacy, economic interest, and alliance cohesion.

In 1919 the Soviet government directed Ludwig Martens to open a trade bureau in New York. Before his deportation two years later, Martens had established contact with nearly one thousand American firms and conducted trade in the face of a stiff Allied embargo. His work planted the seeds for growing commercial ties between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. throughout the 1920s. Because the United States did not recognize the Soviet Union until 1933, historians have viewed the early Soviet–American relationship as an ideological stand-off. Katherine Siegel, drawing on public, private, and corporate documents as well as newly opened Soviet archives, paints a different picture. She finds that business ties flourished between 1923 and 1930, American sales to the Soviets grew twentyfold and American firms supplied Russians with more than a fourth of their imports. American businesses were only too eager to tap into huge Soviet markets. Under the Soviets' New Economic Policy and first Five Year Plan, American firms invested in the U.S.S.R. and sold technical processes, provided consulting services, built factories, and trained Soviet engineers in the U.S. Most significantly, Siegel shows, this commercial relationship encouraged policy shifts at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Thus when Franklin D. Roosevelt opened diplomatic relations with Russia, he was building on ties that had been carefully constructed over the previous fifteen years. Siegel's study makes an important contribution to a new understanding of early Soviet-American relations.

Eclipsed by the scope of the Atlantic economy, obscured by Anglo-German rivalry, and nearly destroyed by the post-1945 division of Europe, the flow of goods across East Central Europe has been, nonetheless, an immensely significant pattern of European economic exchange. For Germany, the Osthandel (Eastern trade) was both a blessing and a curse; its bounty provided much of the raw material for the rise of German economic and political power in Europe, while its lure tantalized German ambitions to the point of madness. Despite the enduring importance of this commerce, no monograph has yet made this pattern of trade the centerpiece of its treatment of German-East European relations. This study puts this important pattern of German-East European trade into the center of discussion and views an extended period of German foreign policy toward Eastern Europe through this lens.