Legal thinkers typically justify contract law on the basis of economics or promissory morality. But Peter Benson takes another approach. He argues that contract is best explained as a transfer of rights governed by a conception of justice. The result is a comprehensive theory of contract law congruent with Rawlsian liberalism.

This collection of essays was developed from a conference on Fairness in Contract Law which was held at the University of Warwick in May 1994. It will contribute to the ongoing discussion and debate as to the role of fairness in contract law. The book includes chapters on the recent Unfair Terms in Consumer Regulations 1994; quality obligations and remedies in contracts for the sale of goods; liabilities of manufacturers and subcontractors to consumers and employers respectively; agreed remedies and corporate contracts. It will be useful to both academics and students studying contract, consumer and commercial law.

Strict enforcement of unreasonable contracts can produce outrageous consequences. Courts of justice should have the means of avoiding them.

This book focuses on unfair contract terms in consumer contracts, in particular the existing legislation and the proposals by the Law Commissions for a new unified regime. In this context it considers, in particular, what we mean by fairness (both procedurally and in substance); the tools used; the European dimension; the move from general principles from the more piecemeal approach typical in UK legal tradition; and the further move in this direction as a result of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.

If, as John Rawls famously suggests, justice is the first virtue of social institutions, how are we to understand the institution of contract law? This book proposes a Rawlsian theory of contract law. It argues that justice requires that we understand contract rules in terms of the idea of reasonable, terms of interaction – that is, terms that would be accepted by reasonable persons moved by a desire for a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms they accept. On that basis, the book explains the main doctrines of contract law, including those governing third parties, in both the Common Law and the Civil Law.

"This book reconsiders the foundations of contract law by clarifying the meaning of fairness and choice. It shows how these ideas were muddled with rise of voluntarism and conceptualism in the nineteenth century. Contract was defined in term of the will of the parties, even though often the parties are bound by terms to which they did not consciously assent and sometimes they are not bound by harsh terms to which they assented. Rules were formulated without regard to the purposes that contract law serves. Current theory and practice recognize these problems but cannot resolve them because they lack a clear idea of fairness in exchange. They approach them by manipulating the idea of choice, or by creating exceptions to previously accepted rules, or by introducing vaguely conceived policy considerations. Economic approaches disregard fairness entirely. This book revives a pre-nineteenth century idea of fairness in exchange. This idea is consistent with modern economic thought and can reconcile concerns about fairness, party autonomy, and the purposes that a contact serves for society and the parties themselves. This book presents an account of contract law that is principled, comprehensive, systematic, and operational in the sense that it explains or criticizes what courts actually do. It seeks to explain the enforceability of contracts, unconscionability, the effect of mistake, and changed circumstances, and problems of assent, interpretation, good faith, and remedies"--