This book introduces and develops Contract Governance as a new approach to contract theory. While the concept of governance has already been developed in Williamson's seminal article, it has, ironically, not received much attention in general contract law theory. Indeed, Contract Governance appears to be an important and necessary complement to corporate governance and in fact, as the second, equally important pillar of governance research in the core of private law. With this in mind, Grundmann, Möslein, and Riesenhuber provide a novel approach in setting an international and interdisciplinary research agenda for developing contract law scholarship. Contract Governance focuses particularly on the ways in which a governance perspective leads to research questions that have been neglected in traditional contract law scholarship, and how, from a governance perspective, the questions are dealt with in a different manner and style. Combining substantive chapters and commentaries, this collection of essays addresses an array of topics, including: third party impact and contract governance problems in herd behaviour; governance of networks of contracts; governance in long-term contractual relationships; contract governance and rule setting; and contract governance and political dimensions.

This book brings together a collection of seven papers on Transaction Cost Economics by Nobel Laureate Professor Oliver E Williamson. The applications of Transaction Cost Economics are extensive, ranging from the field of industrial organization and applied fields of economics such as labor, public finance, comparative economic systems and economic development, to the business fields of strategy, organizational behavior, marketing, finance, operations management, and accounting. In short, as Williamson states, "any problem that originates as or can be reformulated as a contracting problem can be examined to advantage in transaction cost economizing terms." What is referred to as New Institutional Economics is developed in the West in two mainly complementary ways: Property Rights Theory, and Transaction Cost Economics. Of the two, Property Rights Theory developed more rapidly. Transaction Cost Economics has nonetheless taken shape of late. In China, research on New Institutional Economics began in the 1990s and has grown rapidly since. China has similarly given much more attention to Property Rights Theory. Gengxuan Chen, the editor of this volume, recommends that China will benefit by bringing Transaction Cost Economics to bear. Simultaneously, for scholars who study the market economy, Transaction Cost Economics provides a very attractive way to explain the practice of the Chinese market economy.

Outsourcing state functions and the limits of existing regulatory regimes -- Contract as transnational regulatory governance -- The emergence of a transnational private regime for the regulation of PMSCs -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 14. Conclusion: Empire through contract: A private international law perspective -- Abstract -- Introduction -- Self-constituting regimes: Private international law's libertarian view of contract -- Possible antidotes: From the undiscovered DNA of contract law to new global forms of legal pluralism -- Notes -- References -- Index

The Department for Work and Pensions relies on medical assessments to help its decision makers reach an appropriate decision on a customer's entitlement to a wide range of benefits. From April 2013, a new medical assessment will be introduced for Personal Independence Payment. A procurement competition is underway to appoint service providers for this. The Department's contractor for medical services, Atos Healthcare, completed 738,000 face-to-face medical assessments in 2011-12 and charged the Department £112.4 million. This performance review examines the Department's contract management and wider strategy for the supply of medical services, including the Department's contractual relationship with Atos Healthcare; the performance management of Atos Healthcare; the future contracting strategy. Amongst key findings, according to the performance data provided, is that Atos Healthcare has not routinely met all the service standards specified in the contract. This report makes a number of recommendations to strengthen existing governance arrangements; to improve performance monitoring and to strengthen the Department's commercial strategy

This book presents the latest findings relating to behavioral economics and the digital tools applied to contract management. There has been a decisive change in the role of contracts in the past decade, with contracts being transformed from purely legal necessities designed to protect against worst-case scenarios into tools for optimizing ongoing and mutually profitable business relationships with customers. There is an increasing emphasis on tight contracts, where time-risk and additional costs are passed on to the prime contractor, who may suffer heavy penalties in the event of non-performance. Contracts shape the behavior of the parties involved and as such have a major impact on project success. The contract manager’s goals are to protect the interests of the company and its shareholders by minimizing the company’s financial and contractual liabilities and to maximize its profitability while ensuring end-user satisfaction. The contract is usually written before the design is fully developed, and there is often a mismatch between contractual specifications and what the customer actually wants. Good contract management entails preserving the rights of the contractor by ensuring all parties respect their contractual obligations; providing advice to the project managers and engineering team; preparing profitable amendments to contracts or change requests; maintaining good record-keeping in the event that claims arise; filing notices when necessary; and guiding the project to a profitable conclusion. Like the ancient Chinese game of Go, moves made early in the game (notification of events) can shape the nature of a potential conflict one hundred moves later (arbitration threat). Contract management can also smooth the relationship between partners, allowing well-balanced “don’t-trade-a-dollar-for-a-penny” contracts to be managed through an established process rather than as sporadic events (we cannot claim to be in control of our business if we are not in control of the contracts on which it depends). Managing a contract with a mix of incomplete manuals, fragmented information, and poor planning can drive companies to “reinvent the wheel.” Contract management promotes a three-phase sequence to streamline information flows across the contract lifecycle, from the bid phase to performance, project closeout, and final payments.

This book describes version 4 of CATS CM®. This methodology for contract management can be used in both private and public sector organizations, and is valid for both demand and supply side. Contract management is the realization of intended contract objectives by proactively monitoring the fulfillment of all contractually established responsibilities, obligations, procedures, agreements, conditions and rates, resolving all ambiguities, contradictions and white spaces, managing all contract-related risks, and implementing all desired changes to the contract, during the execution phase. CATS CM® offers a methodical and scalable approach to contract management. It provides a description of the principles, roles, and main issues for the contract manager and the best way of working. In addition to a description of the methodology, CATS CM® version 4 also offers specific tools for implementing contract management, for policy as well as for processes. Increasingly, organizations recognize the importance of being in control of their business ecosystem. CATS CM® assists organizations to increase control of their joint responsibility both from a procurement and delivery point of view. A large number of organizations have chosen CATS CM® as the standard for their contract management processes. This new version of CATS CM® has been developed with these various practices in mind. CATS CM® version 4 is based on the principle that the management of a contract in execution has strong similarities on both sides of the contract, i.e. demand and supply; both can best be described as working in conjunction with each other. This book is intended for all who are responsible for, or deal with the execution of contracts: contract managers, business managers, delivery managers, project managers, service managers, facility managers, buyers, procurement managers, compliance managers, risk managers, account managers, sales managers and HR managers, along with their directors and board members on both sides of the contract.