Anthology from the year 2018 in the subject Philosophy - Practical (Ethics, Aesthetics, Culture, Nature, Right, ...), grade: -, Catholic University of Pernambuco (Departamento de Filosofia), language: English, abstract: The present work aims to compile a series of approximations, readings and lines of intervention in reality characterized by the defense and application of philosophy as a way of clarifying the problems and their resolution strategies. In this sense, the book's basis is based on the need for researchers in philosophy at the Catholic University of Pernambuco, in the city of Recife, in the State of Pernambuco, Brazil, to make explicit their reflections on axial issues of ethics and epistemology. This is a collection of philosophical papers divided into two central themes: ethics and epistemology. This work, more than a manual of philosophy, consists of uniting thoughts, paths and proposals for reflection from Brazil, but which can be inspiring for researchers from other parts of the world.

What can we know and what should we believe about today's world? What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues applies the concerns and techniques of epistemology to a wide variety of contemporary issues. Questions about what we can know-and what we should believe-are first addressed through an explicit consideration of the practicalities of working these issues out at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Coady calls for an 'applied turn' in epistemology, a process he likens to the applied turn that transformed the study of ethics in the early 1970s. Subjects dealt with include: Experts-how can we recognize them? And when should we trust them? Rumors-should they ever be believed? And can they, in fact, be a source of knowledge? Conspiracy theories-when, if ever, should they be believed, and can they be known to be true? The blogosphere-how does it compare with traditional media as a source of knowledge and justified belief? Timely, thought provoking, and controversial, What to Believe Now offers a wealth of insights into a branch of philosophy of growing importance-and increasing relevance-in the twenty-first century.

Since the heyday of ordinary language philosophy, Anglophone epistemologists have devoted a great deal of attention to the English word 'know' and to English sentences used to attribute knowledge. Even today, many epistemologists, including contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists are concerned with the truth conditions of "S knows that p," or the proposition it expresses. In all of this literature, the method of cases is used, where a situation is described in English, and then philosophers judge whether it is true that S knows that p, or whether saying "S knows that p" is false, deviant, etc. in that situation. However, English is just one of over 6000 languages spoken around the world, and is the native language of less than 6% of the world's population. When Western epistemology first emerged, in ancient Greece, English did not even exist. So why should we think that facts about the English word "know," the concept it expresses, or subtle semantic properties of "S knows that p" have important implications for epistemology? Are the properties of the English word "know" and the English sentence 'S knows that p' shared by their translations in most or all languages? If that turned out to be true, it would be a remarkable fact that cries out for an explanation. But if it turned out to be false, what are the implications for epistemology? Should epistemologists study knowledge attributions in languages other than English with the same diligence they have shown for the study of English knowledge attributions? If not, why not? In what ways do the concepts expressed by 'know' and its counterparts in different languages differ? And what should epistemologists make of all this? The papers collected here discuss these questions and related issues, and aim to contribute to this important topic and epistemology in general.

This volume addresses issues in epistemology, ethics and political philosophy. It contains new papers on issues such as semantic theory of truth, sandwich theory of knowledge, American pragmatism and scepticism, arguments from ignorance, infallibilism and fallibilism, justification and confirmation, Tarski’s T-schema, experimental results and ordinary truth, epistemic comparativism and experiments, epiphenomenlism and eliminativism about the mental, the identity theory of truth, thoughts and facts, metaontological maximalism and minimalism, morality and rights, aggregation of value judgements and aggregation of preferences, conditional and unconditional ethics, the role of the theory of evolution in moral epistemology, global and international political community, Rawls' views on cosmopolitanism and global justice, international distributive justice. Contributors are: Tomasz Bigaj, Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Tadeusz Buksiński, Robin Cameron, Jan B. Deręgowski, Nigel Dower, Adam Grobler, Jesper Kallestrup, Adrian Kuźniar, Justyna Miklaszewska, Joanna Miksa, Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Katarzyna Paprzycka, Krzysztof Posłajko, Wlodek Rabinowicz, John Skorupski, Leslie Stevenson, Piotr Szałek, Tadeusz Szubka, Joseph Ulatowski, Jan Woleński, Rafał Wonicki, Anna Wójtowicz, Renata Ziemińska

This book presents an in-depth analysis of various philosophical problems, such as democracy, ground of the law, epistemology of ignorance, public and private sphere distinction. The contributors provide a genuinely scholarly basis for the understanding of the philosophical issues on epistemology, ethics and political philosophy.

This Element introduces several prominent themes in contemporary work on the epistemology and methodology of ethics. Topics addressed include skeptical challenges in ethics, epistemic arguments in metaethics, what (if anything) is epistemically distinctive of the ethical. Also considered are methodological questions in ethics, including questions about which ethical concepts we should investigate, and what our goals should be in ethical inquiry.

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.