The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the debate surrounding the policy of constructive engagement and the dilemma the Reagan Administration had in justifying continued acknowledgement of the apartheid government of South Africa during the mid 1980's. At issue is whether Reagan's engagement with South Africa was practical and ultimately helped end apartheid; or, was it counterproductive and was merely tacit approval of the South African government that extended the life of apartheid.

Reagan’s administration used the policy of constructive engagement to bring gradual reform to the apartheid system and build peace in the southern African region. The coordination of anti-apartheid activist organizations and members advocating for harsher economic pressure on South Africa successfully raised US public awareness and shifted public opinion against constructive engagement’s gradualist policies. As a result, leading Reagan staffers like Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker recalibrated constructive engagement’s focus to quicken regional peacebuilding maintain stability and control of US foreign policy in the public eye. This thesis analyzes the early influences on constructive engagement and Reagan’s efforts to maintain economic gradualism while emphasizing the role of US anti-apartheid activists as active agents of change in Reagan’s policies towards South Africa. “Cannot Afford to Publicly Surrender” focuses on how Reagan staffers and anti-apartheid activists used public mediums as stages for their respective agendas on US foreign policy.

From 1981-1988, the administration of Ronald Reagan adopted a policy of constructive engagement toward apartheid South Africa. Constructive engagement was formulated in order to achieve three goals, both strategic and moral: to maintain a good relationship between Washington and Pretoria, which the strongly anti-communist Reagan administration viewed as vital in terms of strategic resources and the Cold War; to gently encourage the brutal and racist South African government into a gradual reforming of apartheid; and to use the policy of linkage to resolve regional disputes in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique. Over the course of the Reagan presidency, however, it became clear that both constructive engagement and linkage were structurally flawed and rested on incorrect assumptions. Exacerbating this problem was an outpouring of domestic and international outrage at the policy's immorality and constant failures. Ultimately, by 1988, constructive engagement had mostly failed to accomplish either its strategic or moral goals.

This book intends to offer an alternative lens for regionalism studies in Southeast Asia. Despite of its widely acknowledged status as one of the most successful regionalism, ASEAN still suffers from numerous obstacles. Yet, in the midst of ASEAN uncertain future trajectories, there is only limited consensus on how to approach ASEAN regionalism. Scholars of ASEAN regionalism tend to use ASEAN identity as the main explanation of cooperation among ASEAN member states. However, this approach suffers from limitations. Emphasis on static, traditional, and all-encompassing identity has made issue-specific cooperation and its internal dynamics neglected. The way issue-specific cooperation alters ASEAN architectures also remains understudied. By shifting attentions to issue-specific cooperation, this book attempts to fully grasp the dynamics of 50 years of ASEAN cooperation. Why could ASEAN member states reach consensus in certain issues—ranging from energy, environment, human rights, disaster management, human security, to infectious disease—albeit ASEAN values such as non-interference and informality? How do these practices of cooperation reshape the idea of ASEAN values? Will the changing practice of issue-specific cooperation spillover to the strengthening of ASEAN regionalism?

Borstelmann (history, Cornell U.) brings to light the neglected history of Washington's strong, but hushed, backing for the white supremacist National Party government that won power in South Africa in 1948, and for its formal establishment of apartheid. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR