Chile has embarked on an ambitious path towards a new constitution. This report presents the results of a benchmarking exercise conducted by the OECD of possible constitutional provisions, reflecting the experiences of OECD member countries.

Chile has embarked on an ambitious path towards a new constitution. For all countries, drafting a new constitution or amending an existing one is a stimulating challenge, but also a demanding process from both a political and technical standpoint. This report presents the results of a benchmarking exercise conducted by the OECD of possible constitutional provisions, reflecting the experiences of OECD member countries. The components covered include economic and social rights, the system of government, multi-level governance, constitutional review, fiscal governance and the role and functioning of central banks.

Chile has embarked on an ambitious path towards a new constitution. For all countries, drafting a new constitution or amending an existing one is a stimulating challenge, but also a demanding process from both a political and technical standpoint. This report presents the results of a benchmarking exercise conducted by the OECD of possible constitutional provisions, reflecting the experiences of OECD member countries. The components covered include economic and social rights, the system of government, multi-level governance, constitutional review, fiscal governance and the role and functioning of central banks.

This report provides an in-depth analysis of Peru’s justice system and offers concrete recommendations, based on OECD countries' experience and best practices, for how to make it more effective, efficient, transparent, accessible, and people-centred. Building on the OECD’s Recommendation on Access to Justice and People-Centred Justice Systems, the report suggests how Peru can best implement its challenging justice reform agenda so that access to justice is available to all, including the most in need.

Public authorities from all levels of government increasingly turn to Citizens' Assemblies, Juries, Panels and other representative deliberative processes to tackle complex policy problems ranging from climate change to infrastructure investment decisions. They convene groups of people representing a wide cross-section of society for at least one full day – and often much longer – to learn, deliberate, and develop collective recommendations that consider the complexities and compromises required for solving multifaceted public issues.

The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.

This book explores the role of constitutions in public finance, with a special focus on transitional context in Central and Eastern Europe. The main questions addressed are: How do formal constitutional provisions that matter for public finance come about? How do constitutions shape policy choices in public finance? Part l of the book puts forth an analytical framework for analysing how fiscal constitutional provisions come about and tests the conjectures with the case of constitution-making in Estonia in 1991-1992. Part II summarises, synthesises and criticises the emerging orthodoxy in positive constitutional public finance and examines whether it can explain the commitment to fiscal discipline in Estonia between 1992 and 2007. Part III examines theoretically and empirically how constitutions can shape public finance laws via constitutional review, auto-limitation and constitutional deliberations.