Arkes re-examines legal cases and concepts long thought settled, finding that their meaning is far less clear than commonly accepted.

Hadley Arkes argues that it is necessary to move "beyond the Constitution," to the principles that stood antecedent to the text, if we are to understand the text and apply the Constitution to the cases that arise every day in our law.

This book restores to us an understanding that was once settled in the "moral sciences": that there are propositions, in morals and law, which are not only true but which cannot be otherwise. It was understood in the past that, in morals or in mathematics, our knowledge begins with certain axioms that must hold true of necessity; that the principles drawn from these axioms hold true universally, unaffected by variations in local "cultures"; and that the presence of these axioms makes it possible to have, in the domain of morals, some right answers. Hadley Arkes restates the grounds of that older understanding and unfolds its implications for the most vexing political problems of our day. The author turns first to the classic debate between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas. After establishing the groundwork and properties of moral propositions, he traces their application in such issues as selective conscientious objection, justifications for war, the war in Vietnam, a nation's obligation to intervene abroad, the notion of supererogatory acts, the claims of "privacy," and the problem of abortion.

From Amherst College, Hadley Arkes seeks to restore, for a new generation, the jurisprudence of the late Justice of the Supreme Court George Sutherlandone anchored in the understanding of natural rights. Arkes argues that if both liberals and conservatives would study the writings of George Sutherland, with unclouded eyes, both groups would set aside their differences and return to the moral ground of their jurisprudence.

Publisher Description

If confronted with a democratic result they regard as intolerable, should citizens revolt or pursue democratic means of social change?

Are constitutional rights based exclusively in uniquely American considerations, or are they based at least in part on principles that transcend the boundaries of any particular country, such as the requirements of freedom or dignity? By viewing constitutional law through the prism of this fundamental question, Universal Rights and the Constitution exposes an overlooked difficulty with opinions rendered by the Supreme Court, namely, an inherent ambiguity about the kinds of arguments that count in constitutional interpretation, which weakens the foundations of our most cherished rights. Rejecting current debates over constitutional interpretation as flawed, Stephen A. Simon offers an innovative framework designed to provide clearer foundations for rights interpretations while preserving a meaningful but limited role for universal arguments. He reveals the vital connections among contemporary debates over such matters as the right to privacy, the constitutionality of the death penalty, and the role of foreign law in constitutional interpretation.