Contemporary positivism has taken a communitarian turn. Hart, in the Postscript to quot;The Concept of Law,quot; clarifies that the rule of recognition is a special sort of social practice: a convention. It is not clear whether Hart, here, means convention in the strict sense elaborated by David Lewis, or in some weaker sense. A number of contemporary positivists, including Jules Coleman (at one point), Andrei Marmor, and Gerald Postema, have argued that the rule of recognition is something like a Lewis-convention. Others have suggested that the rule of recognition is conventional in a weaker sense - specifically, by figuring in a shared cooperative activity (SCA) among officials. Chris Kutz, Scott Shapiro, and Jules Coleman (more recently) have adopted this model. This Article criticizes the Lewis-convention and SCA models of the rule of recognition, drawing on U.S. constitutional theory. Imagine a society of U.S. officials who are committed to the text of the 1787 Constitution in a strong way: each official would continue to accept the text as supreme law even if every other official defected to an alternative text, and no official is prepared to bargain or negotiate with the others about the supremacy of the text. The social practice among these officials is neither a Lewis-convention (since there is no alternative text to which every official would shift if every other official did), nor an SCA (since the officials have no general intention to mesh their conceptions of legal validity, and in particular have no intention to compromise with officials who deny the supremacy of the 1787 text). Therefore, under the Lewis-convention and SCA models, a hypothetical society of U.S. officials who are committed, first and foremost, to the 1787 text rather than to the community of officials, is not a full-fledged legal system. But this is deeply counterintuitive. The hypothetical society simply embodies, in a particularly pure form, an attitude of fidelity to the 1787 text that many officials and citizens currently profess. The tension between the Lewis-convention and SCA models of the rule of recognition, and constitutional fidelity, points the way to a different model of the rule of recognition: namely, that the rule of recognition is a social norm.

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution is a volume of original essays that discuss the applicability of Hart's rule of recognition model of a legal system to U.S. constitutional law. The contributors are leading scholars in analytical jurisprudence and constitutional theory, including Matthew Adler, Larry Alexander, Mitchell Berman, Michael Dorf, Kent Greenawalt, Richard Fallon, Michael Green, Kenneth Einar Himma, Stephen Perry, Frederick Schauer, Scott Shapiro, Jeremy Waldron, and Wil Waluchow. The volume makes a contribution both in jurisprudence, using the U.S. as a "test case" that highlights the strengths and limitations of the rule of recognition model; and in constitutional theory, by showing how the model can illuminate topics such as the role of the Supreme Court, the constitutional status of precedent, the legitimacy of unwritten sources of constitutional law, the choice of methods for interpreting the text of the Constitution, and popular constitutionalism.

A volume of original essays that discusses the applicability of H. L. A. Hart's rule of recognition model of a legal system to U. S. Constitutional law as discussed in his book "The concept of law".

This book makes the radical claim that rather than interpreting the Constitution from on high, the Court should be reflecting popular will--or the wishes of the people themselves.

This book examines the evolution of customary international law (CIL) as a source of international law. Using the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a key case study, the book explores the importance of CIL in the development of international criminal law and focuses on the ways in which international criminal tribunals can be said to change the ways in which CIL is formed and identified. In doing so, the book surveys the process and substance of CIL, as well as the problematic distinction between the elements of state practice and opinio juris. By applying an inclusive positivist approach, Noora Arajärvi analyses the methodologies of identification of CIL in selected cases of the ICTY, and their normative foundations. Through examination of the case-law and the reasoning of courts and tribunals, Arajärvi demonstrates to what extent the court's chosen method of identification of CIL affects the process of custom formation and the resulting system of norms in general. The book will be of great value to researchers and scholars of international law, international relations, and practitioners with interests in customary international law.

Adjudication between conflicting normative universes that do not share the same vocabulary, standards of rationality, and moral commitments cannot be resolved by recourse to traditional principles. Such cases are always in a sense tragic. And what is called for, in our pluralistic and conflictual world is not to be found, as many would suppose, in an impersonal set of procedures with which all participants could be treated as having rationally agreed. The very idea of such a neutral system is an illusion. Rather, what is needed, Julen Etxabe argues in this book, is a heightened awareness of the difficulty of judgment. The Experience of Tragic Judgments draws upon Sophocles’ play Antigone in order to consider this difficulty and the virtues that attend its acknowledgment. Based on the transformative experience that the audience undergoes in engaging with this play what is proposed is a reconceptualization of judgment: not as it is generally thought to occur in a single isolated moment, like the falling of an axe, but rather as an experience that develops in and through space and time.

Negli ultimi anni si è sovente parlato di de-secolarizzazione. Al tempo stesso, tuttavia, non si è mai spenta la voce di chi afferma che la modernità ha inaugurato un'epoca in cui la religione è in via di estinzione e la secolarizzazione ha vinto la partita della storia. Se così fosse, un libro sullo 'spazio religioso’ sarebbe poco più che un testo su un tema di nicchia. C’è da chiedersi, tuttavia: lo 'spazio religioso' può davvero considerarsi scisso e categoricamente distinguibile dallo spazio in generale? Le città europee sono state storicamente costruite intorno a una chiesa collocata accanto alla sede del governo, generando a sua volta lo ‘spazio' della piazza pubblica principale. Nella maggior parte dei siti urbani, questa distribuzione topografica urbana permane, e l’Italia costituisce, da questo punto di vista un esempio paradigmatico. Proprio in Italia, i conflitti sull’utilizzo delle chiese cattoliche in disuso, sulle comunità musulmane che necessitano di spazi per la preghiera, sugli spazi interreligiosi e sul connesso uso dello spazio urbano nel suo complesso, riflettono preoccupazioni pressanti su come vivere le nostre città, sempre più plurali, e su come definire i confini tra la libertà degli uni e la libertà degli altri. Su questo terreno di scontro entra in gioco il diritto, che regola lo spazio e tutte le pratiche che si svolgono al suo interno. La ‘liturgia’, intesa attraverso la sua radice etimologica di ‘azione nello spazio pubblico,’ serve come chiave ricostruttivo-cognitiva che potrebbe supportare il diritto a qualificare in modo più adeguato gli oggetti e i destinatari della regolamentazione da esso offerta. Se il tempo e lo spazio sono impossibili da separare, guardare indietro è l'unico modo per scandagliare il futuro (e viceversa). A questo scopo, nel testo vengono offerte alcune brevi incursioni storiche accanto all'analisi giuridica dell’esperienza contemporanea, e ciò con l’obiettivo di illuminare un percorso possibile verso un orizzonte di giustizia spaziale. Nei tre capitoli che lo compongono, il volume tratta rispettivamente del rapporto tra spazio sacro e spazio secolare della città; delle questioni teorico-giuridiche e giurisdizionali che ruotano attorno al problema della disponibilità dei luoghi di culto all’interno del tessuto urbano; e, infine, dei presupposti storici e metodologici per l’elaborazione di una ‘giustizia spaziale’ costituzionale. DOI: 10.13134/979-12-5977-322-7