Presidential term limits restrict the maximum length of time that presidents can serve in office. They stipulate the length of term the presidents can serve between elections and the number of terms that presidents are permitted to serve. While comparative scholarship has long studied important institutions such presidentialism vs. parliamentarism and the effects of different electoral systems, we lack a comprehensive understanding of the role and effects of presidential term limits. Yet presidential term limits and term lengths are one of the most fundamental institutions of democracy. By ensuring compulsory rotation in office, they are at the heart of a democratic dilemma. What is the appropriate trade-off between allowing the unrestricted selection of candidates at presidential elections vs. restricting selection procedures to prevent the possibility of dictatorial takeover by presidents who are unwilling to step down? In the context of a long and on-going history of changes to presidential term limits and the many and varied ways in which term limits have been both applied and avoided, this book explains the factors behind the introduction, stability, abolition, and avoidance of presidential term limits, as well as the consequences of changes to presidential term limits, and it does so in the context of non-democracies, third-wave countries, and consolidated democracies. It includes comparative, theoretical, and practitioner-oriented chapters, as well as detailed country case studies of presidential term limits across the world and over time.

This book examines the most recent trends in the constitutional and legal regulations in all Latin American countries regarding the amparo proceeding. It analyzes the regulations of the seventeen amparo statutes in force in Latin America, as well as the regulation on the amparo guarantee established in Article 25 of the American Convention of Human Rights.

Arturo J.Cruz, Jr argues that political learning, trust-building, and institutional innovation by political elites broke Nicaragua's post-colonial cycle of anarchy and petty despotism, leaving in its place an increasingly inclusive oligarchic democracy that made possible state-led economic development for the next thirty years. Subsequent economic development gave rise to new social groups and localist power centres that remained politically disparate, and in turn forged an outsiders' coalition to bring down the Republic.

Constitutionalism in the Americas unites the work of leading scholars of constitutional law, comparative law and Latin American and U.S. constitutional law to provide a critical and provocative look at the state of constitutional law across the Americas today. The diverse chapters employ a variety of methodologies – empirical, historical, philosophical and textual analysis – in the effort to provide a comprehensive look at a generation of constitutional change across two continents.