This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1864 edition. Excerpt: ... chapter vii. exchanges under the author'S system. It will be very easy, under the author's system, to give the currency a uniform value in all parts of the country; as follows: In the first place, where the capital shall consist of mortgages, it will be very easy for all the banks, in any State, to make their solvency known to each other. There would be so many banks, that some system would naturally be adopted for this purpose. Perhaps this system would be, that a standing committee, appointed by the banks, would be established, in each State, to whom each bank in the State would be required to produce satisfactory evidence of its solvency, before its bills should be received by the other banks of the State. When the banks, or any considerable number of the banks, of any particular State--Missouri for example--shall have made themselves so far acquainted with each other's solvency, as to be ready to receive each other's bills, they will be ready to make a still further arrangement for their mutual benefit, viz.: to unite in establishing one general agency in St. Louis, another in New Orleans, another in Chicago, another in Cincinnati, another in New York, another in Philadelphia, another in Baltimore, and another in Boston, where the bills of all these Missouri banks shall be redeemed. And thus the bills of all Missouri banks, that belonged to the Association, would be placed at par at all the great commercial points. Each bank, belonging to the Association, might print, on the back of its bills, "Redeemable at the Missouri Agencies, in St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati," &c. In this way all the banks of each State might unite to establish agencies in all the large cities for the redemption of their bills. The" banks might safely make...

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This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. ++++ The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to ensure edition identification: ++++ Considerations For Bankers, And Holders Of United States Bonds Lysander Spooner A. Williams & Co., 1864 Paper money

We analyze holdings of public bonds by over 20,000 banks in 191 countries, and the role of these bonds in 20 sovereign defaults over 1998-2012. Banks hold many public bonds (on average 9% of their assets), particularly in less financially-developed countries. During sovereign defaults, banks increase their exposure to public bonds, especially large banks and when expected bond returns are high. At the bank level, bondholdings correlate negatively with subsequent lending during sovereign defaults. This correlation is mostly due to bonds acquired in pre-default years. These findings shed light on alternative theories of the sovereign default-banking crisis nexus.