This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information and data processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and to computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. One of the most, if not the most, exciting developments within cognitive science has been the emergence of connectionism as an alternative to the computational conception of the mind that tends to dominate the discipline. In this volume, John Tienson and Terence Horgan have brought together a fine collection of stimulating studies on connectionism and its significance. As the Introduction explains, the most pressing questions concern whether or not connectionism can provide a new conception of the nature of mentality. By focusing on the similarities and differences between connectionism and other approaches to cognitive science, the chapters of this book supply valuable resources that advance our understanding of these difficult issues. J.H.F.

Connectionism and the Mind provides a clear and balanced introduction to connectionist networks and explores theoretical and philosophical implications. Much of this discussion from the first edition has been updated, and three new chapters have been added on the relation of connectionism to recent work on dynamical systems theory, artificial life, and cognitive neuroscience. Read two of the sample chapters on line: Connectionism and the Dynamical Approach to Cognition: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/pdf/bechtel.pdf Networks, Robots, and Artificial Life: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/pdf/bechtel2.pdf

In The Algebraic Mind, Gary Marcus attempts to integrate two theories about how the mind works, one that says that the mind is a computer-like manipulator of symbols, and another that says that the mind is a large network of neurons working together in parallel. Resisting the conventional wisdom that says that if the mind is a large neural network it cannot simultaneously be a manipulator of symbols, Marcus outlines a variety of ways in which neural systems could be organized so as to manipulate symbols, and he shows why such systems are more likely to provide an adequate substrate for language and cognition than neural systems that are inconsistent with the manipulation of symbols. Concluding with a discussion of how a neurally realized system of symbol-manipulation could have evolved and how such a system could unfold developmentally within the womb, Marcus helps to set the future agenda of cognitive neuroscience.

First Published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Bringing together the best classical and contemporary writings in the philosophy of mind and organized by topic, this anthology allows readers to follow the development of thinking in five broad problem areas--the mind/body problem, mental causation, associationism/connectionism, mental imagery, and innate ideas--over 2500 years of philosophy. The writings range from Plato and Descartes to Fodor and the PDP research group, showing how many of the current concerns in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are firmly rooted in history. The editors have provided helpful introductions to each of the main sections.Readings from: Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Nicolas Malebranche, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Henry Huxley, William James, Oswald Külpe, John Watson, jean Piaget, Gilbert Ryle, U.T. Place, Hilary Putnam, Daniel Dennett, Donald Davidson, Jerry Fodor, Roger Shepard, Jacqueline Metzler, Saul Kripke, Ned Block, Noam Chomsky, Stephen Kosslyn, Zenon Pylyshyn, Patricia Churchland, James McClelland, David Rumelhart, Geoffrey Hinton, Paul Smolensky, Seymour Papert.

In this volume, the authors present their view of cognition. They propose that unlike the classical paradigm that takes the mind to be a computer, the mind is best understood as a dynamical system realized in a neural network.

Mind design is the endeavor to understand mind (thinking, intellect) in terms of its design (how it is built, how it works). Unlike traditional empirical psychology, it is more oriented toward the "how" than the "what." An experiment in mind design is more likely to be an attempt to build something and make it work—as in artificial intelligence—than to observe or analyze what already exists. Mind design is psychology by reverse engineering. When Mind Design was first published in 1981, it became a classic in the then-nascent fields of cognitive science and AI. This second edition retains four landmark essays from the first, adding to them one earlier milestone (Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence") and eleven more recent articles about connectionism, dynamical systems, and symbolic versus nonsymbolic models. The contributors are divided about evenly between philosophers and scientists. Yet all are "philosophical" in that they address fundamental issues and concepts; and all are "scientific" in that they are technically sophisticated and concerned with concrete empirical research. Contributors Rodney A. Brooks, Paul M. Churchland, Andy Clark, Daniel C. Dennett, Hubert L. Dreyfus, Jerry A. Fodor, Joseph Garon, John Haugeland, Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, Zenon W. Pylyshyn, William Ramsey, Jay F. Rosenberg, David E. Rumelhart, John R. Searle, Herbert A. Simon, Paul Smolensky, Stephen Stich, A.M. Turing, Timothy van Gelder