James Holt offers a new answer to the question "What happened to progressivism in the Republican party?" The battles over the Payne-Aldrich tariff, the powers of Speaker Cannon, military preparedness, the elections of 1912 and 1916, and Wilson's New Freedom are used to exemplify the attempts of insurgent Republican Senators to reconcile progressive ideals with party commitment. But these men, Robert La Follette, Albert Cummins, George Norris, and William Borah among them, found that on the national level their efforts aided only the Democrats and that a third party was precluded by their own partisanship and their dependence on Republican constituencies.

When will dissident members of a Congress successfully seize power from their party leaders and fellow lawmakers? When they organize.

From the 1910 overthrow of "Czar" Joseph Cannon to the reforms enacted when Republicans took over the House in 1995, institutional change within the U.S. Congress has been both a product and a shaper of congressional politics. For several decades, scholars have explained this process in terms of a particular collective interest shared by members, be it partisanship, reelection worries, or policy motivations. Eric Schickler makes the case that it is actually interplay among multiple interests that determines institutional change. In the process, he explains how congressional institutions have proved remarkably adaptable and yet consistently frustrating for members and outside observers alike. Analyzing leadership, committee, and procedural restructuring in four periods (1890-1910, 1919-1932, 1937-1952, and 1970-1989), Schickler argues that coalitions promoting a wide range of member interests drive change in both the House and Senate. He shows that multiple interests determine institutional innovation within a period; that different interests are important in different periods; and, more broadly, that changes in the salient collective interests across time do not follow a simple logical or developmental sequence. Institutional development appears disjointed, as new arrangements are layered on preexisting structures intended to serve competing interests. An epilogue assesses the rise and fall of Newt Gingrich in light of these findings. Schickler's model of "disjointed pluralism" integrates rational choice theory with historical institutionalist approaches. It both complicates and advances efforts at theoretical synthesis by proposing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of institutional innovation--and thus of American political development and history.

Lindbergh was the first solo pilot to cross the Atlantic non-stop from New York to Paris, in 1927. This awe-inspiring fight made him the most celebrated men of his day-a romantic symbol of the new aviation age. However, tragedy struck in 1932, where his baby was kidnapped and found dead. The unbearable trial forced Lindbergh into exile in England and France. However, his soon fasciation and involvement with the Nazi regime, resulted in public opinion turning against him. His life was at the forefront of pioneering research in aeronautics and rocketry. Also, his wife became one of the century's leading feminist voices. This biography explores the golden couple who have been considered American royalty.

Dominant theories of regulatory choice privilege the goals and actions of district-oriented legislators and organized groups. Presidents, Parties, and the State challenges this conventional frame, placing presidential elections and national party leaders at the centre of American regulatory state development. Historically the 'out-party' in national politics between 1884 and 1936, the Democratic party of Grover Cleveland, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt confronted a severe political quandary, one which pit long-term ideological commitments against short-term electoral opportunities. In short, Democrats, when in power, were forced to choose between enacting the regulatory agenda of their traditional party base, or legislating the programs of voting blocs deemed pivotal to the consolidation of national party power. Coalition-building imperatives drove Democratic leaders to embrace the latter alternative, prompting legislative intervention to secure outcomes consistent with national party needs. In the end, the electoral logic that fuelled Democratic choice proved consequential for the trajectory of American state development.