At the heart of this book is the problem of war termination. Britain won an almost unbroken string of tactical military victories during an undeclared war against the Republic of Indonesia in the 1960s, yet it proved difficult to translate this into strategic success. Using conflict termination theories, this book argues that British strategy during Confrontation was both exemplary and flawed, both of which need not be mutually exclusive. The British experience in Indonesia represents an illuminating case study of the difficulties associated with strategy and the successful termination of conflicts. The value of this book lies in two areas: as a contribution to the literature on British counter-insurgency operations and as a contribution to the debates on the problems of war termination in the context of strategic thought.

Although considerable attention has been paid to deterrence theory and crisis management, the equally important topic of ending wars has been virtually ignored. Conflict termination is the stepchild of U.S. strategy for a number of reasons. Thinking about how wars should end presupposes acceptance of the fact that war—especially nuclear war— is possible. Further, analyzing options for ending conflicts implies less-than-total victory, a concept that not only runs counter to the U.S. approach to warfare but also raises the specter of “limited war,†an approach that fell into disfavor following Korea and Vietnam. Finally, defining conflict termination objectives assumes that we think more about ends than means, that we know what is important to us and why, and thus understand the risks we will accept to defend specific interests and objectives. The contributors examine a wide variety of topics, ranging from Soviet and U.S. views on conflict termination to past, present, and future U.S. military service contributions. Their aim is to demonstrate the importance of careful evaluation of conflict termination goals during peacetime because when war begins passions and emotions will cloud decisionmaking.

At the heart of this book is the problem of war termination. Britain won an almost unbroken string of tactical military victories during an undeclared war against the Republic of Indonesia in the 1960s, yet it proved difficult to translate this into strategic success. Using conflict termination theories, this book argues that British strategy during Confrontation was both exemplary and flawed, both of which need not be mutually exclusive. The British experience in Indonesia represents an illuminating case study of the difficulties associated with strategy and the successful termination of conflicts. The value of this book lies in two areas: as a contribution to the literature on British counter-insurgency operations and as a contribution to the debates on the problems of war termination in the context of strategic thought.

What makes wars drag on and why do they end when they do? Here H. E. Goemans brings theoretical rigor and empirical depth to a long-standing question of securities studies. He explores how various government leaders assess the cost of war in terms of domestic politics and their own postwar fates. Goemans first develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war, Goemans maintains, can vary greatly depending on the type of government they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare. Democracies, according to Goemans, will prefer to withdraw quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the populace. Autocracies will do likewise so as not to be overthrown by their internal enemies. Mixed regimes, which are made up of several competing groups and which exclude a substantial proportion of the people from access to power, will likely see little risk in continuing a losing war in the hope of turning the tide. Goemans explores the conditions and the reasoning behind this "gamble for resurrection" as well as other strategies, using rational choice theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Germany, Britain, France, and Russia during World War I. In so doing, he offers a new perspective of the Great War that integrates domestic politics, international politics, and battlefield developments.

′...effectively fills a long-standing void and will no doubt be hailed as a much-needed new addition to the literature... This text very much exemplifies the strength of Ho-Won Jeong as a theorist and one of the more prolific writers in the larger peace and conflict studies field... the final three chapters on ′De-escalation Dynamics′ (which includes a brief section on third party intervention), on ′Conciliation Strategies,′ and especially the one on ′Ending Conflict,′ which provides a range of outcomes beyond the usual focus on third party intervention (read mediation) epitomizes the value of this new text′ - Journal of Peace Research ′...an awesome tour d′horizon of modern war, violence, and confrontation within and between nations. Illustrating via just about every conflict in every corner of the world, the author invokes an endless array of insights and interpretations, ranging from the micro to the macro, beautifully written in a seamless sequence of closely linked and discursive essays.′ - Professor J. David Singer, University of Michigan ′Ho-Won Jeong has written an illuminatinbg analysis of the dynamics of conflict. He lays out the tools we have to analyze conflict in a literate and comprehensive way. A valuable book for anyone interested in a more comprehensive understanding of conflict, its sources, and its deescalation and termination′ - Janice Gross Stein, Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management, Director, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto ′Jeong has successfully combined behavioral and structural analysis of the dynamics of social conflict. This volume covers the multiple dimensions - escalation, entrapment, de-escalation, termination, and resolution - both of violent and non-violent confrontation between adversaries, as well as the utility and limitations of external intervention. For students of the social sciences, it should serve as an excellent introduction to the complex realities of social conflict.′ - Milton Esman, John S. Knight Professor of International Studies, Emeritus, Cornell University By examining the dynamic forces which shape and re-shape major conflicts, this timely book provides students with the knowledge base needed to successfully study conflict sources, processes and transformations. Broad in focus, it addresses the multiple social, political and psychological features central to understanding conflict situations and behaviour. A range of both recent and historical examples (including the Arab-Israeli conflict, the ′War on Terrorism′, the Cold War, and the civil wars in Sudan, former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka) are discussed, illustrating the application of concepts and theories essential to the analysis of inter-group, inter-state and intra-state conflict and conflict resolution in a wider context. Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis is key reading for students of international relations, peace and conflict studies, conflict resolution, international security and international law.

This volume traces the historical roots and evolution of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in modern Asia. Focusing on armed rebellions and use of armed forces by both Western powers and indigenous states from the nineteenth century till present day, the volume unravels the problematic of change–continuity and addresses key questions on the nature of warfare. The book looks at eight different regions of Asia: US counter-insurgencies in Philippines; the British initiative in Indonesia and independent Indonesia’s counter-insurgency against its domestic populace; post-World War II Malaya; French and US war in Vietnam; British and Indian counter-insurgencies in North-East India between the nineteenth and early twenty-first century; Indian and Sri Lankan operations in Sri Lanka during late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; British and US-NATO war in Afghanistan from the nineteenth century till 2014; and British and US counter-insurgency in Iraq during the twentieth and first two decades of the twenty-first centuries. The volume will greatly interest scholars and researchers of modern Asian history, military and strategic studies, politics and international relations as well as government institutions and think-tanks.

The first comprehensive treatment of how the United States has handled the final stages of its conflicts-from World War I to Iraq-spoiled repeatedly by leaders' failures to plan clearly for what to do when the guns fall silent. Concerned with not repeating past errors, our leaders miscalculate and prolong the conflict or invite unwelcome results. In his penetrating analysis of past, present, and future wars, Rose suggests how to break this cycle.