esistance capabilities of US adversaries.

The second edition of The Political Economy of Iraq is as comprehensive and accessible as the first with updated data and analysis. Frank R. Gunter discusses in detail how the convergence of the ISIS insurgency, collapse in oil prices, and massive youth unemployment produced a serious political crisis in 2020. This work ends with a discussion of key policy decisions that will determine Iraq’s future. This volume will be a valuable resource for anyone with a professional, business, or academic interest in the post-2003 political economy of Iraq.

The conflict in Iraq is characterized by three faces of war: interstate conflict, civil war, and insurgency. The Coalition's invasion of Iraq in March 2003 began as an interstate war. No sooner had Saddam Hussein been successfully deposed, however, than U.S.-led forces faced a lethal insurgency. After Sunni al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Shia al-Askari Shrine in 2006, the burgeoning conflict took on the additional element of civil war with sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia. The most effective strategies in a war as complicated as the three-level conflict in Iraq are intertwined and complementary, according to the editors of this volume. For example, the "surge" in U.S. troops in 2007 went beyond an increase in manpower; the mission had changed, giving priority to public security. This new direction also simultaneously addressed the insurgency as well as the civil war by forging new, trusting relationships between Americans and Iraqis and between Sunni and Shia. This book has broad implications for future decisions about war and peace in the twenty-first century.

A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.

This book examines performance in the context of the 2003 Iraq War and subsequent conflicts with Daesh, or the so-called Islamic State. Working within a theater and performance studies lens, it analyzes adaptations of Greek tragedy, documentary theater, political performances by the Bush administration, protest performances, satiric news television programs, and post-apocalyptic narratives in popular culture. By considering performance across genre and media, War as Performance offers an interdisciplinary approach to the study of culture, warfare, and militarization, and argues that spectacular and banal aesthetics of contemporary war positions performance as a practice struggling to distance itself from appropriation by the military for violent ends. Contemporary warfare has infiltrated our narratives to such an extent that it holds performance hostage. As lines between the military and performance weaken, this book analyzes how performance responds to and potentially shapes war and conflict in the new century.

External intervention by the U.N. and other actors in ethnic conflicts has interfered with the state-building process in post-colonial states. Rear examines the 1991 uprisings in Iraq and demonstrates how this intervention has contributed to the problems with democratization experienced in the post-Saddam era. This timely work will appeal to scholars of International Relations and Middle East studies, as well as those seeking greater insight into the current conflict in Iraq.

This pioneering book, now thoroughly updated to incorporate important research, explains the causes of war through a sustained combination of theoretical insights and detailed case studies. Cashman and Robinson find that while all wars have multiple causes, certain factors typically combine in identifiable “dangerous patterns.” Through their examination of World War I, World War II in the Pacific, the Six-Day War, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Iran-Iraq War, and the US invasion of Iraq, the authors lay out the complex multilevel processes by which disputes between countries erupt into bloody conflicts. Ideal for a range of courses in international relations at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, this focused text clearly explains theory and applies it to concrete case-study examples in a way that allows students to fully understand the origins of war.