Since 1957, the Pugwash Conferences have brought together influential scholars and public figures concerned with reducing the danger of nuclear war. Meeting in private as individuals, rather than as representatives of their governments or institutions, Pugwash participants exchange views with a combination of candour and flexibility seldom found i

This book, first published in 1980, presents the findings of the SIPRI-organized 1979 international symposium on the destruction and conversion of chemical weapons. Thirty experts from 14 countries discussed the destruction and conversion of present stockpiles of chemical warfare agents and munitions; the destruction and conversion of CW research and development facilities; verification of compliance, and confidence-building measures facilitating verification; and the environmental and occupational health hazards involved in maintaining and in disposing of stockpiles of CW agents and munitions.

The development, production, stockpiling and use in war of biological and toxin weapons are prohibited by international law. Although not explicitly stated, the two treaties outlawing such activities, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibit the continuation of activities previously performed in Biological and Toxin Weapons facilities not justified for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Because conversion and other means of cessation of former BTW facilities are not explicitly addressed in the treaties mentioned above the problems involved in conversion ofBTW facilities have thus far only been discussed marginally in the open literature. In times of increased awareness of the danger of biological and toxin warfare (including the increased danger of terrorist use of biological and toxin weapons) it seemed necessary to us to invite experts from different parts of the world to discuss the pros and cons of conversion and the problems involved. It also became obvious to us that the conversion of former BTW facilities should be discussed with respect to the necessity of peaceful internatioual cooperation in areas related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. An additional reason to discuss matters of peaceful cooperation is that cooperation is explictly requested by Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

This Commentary on the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention builds on a previous publication by the same authors - A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (Kluwer 1994). It focuses on the verification regime established under the Convention and analyses the results of the preparatory phase as well as the practical experience gathered by the OPCW since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. The book follows the methodological approach taken in the earlier publication - a paragraph by paragraph discussion of the text. It discusses those provisions which are relevant for the areas of verification where the OPCW has actually conducted inspections and thus acquired practical experience (i.e. routine inspections of chemical weapons and related facilities, and facilities related to the chemicals listed under Schedule 1 and 2). The book is intended to stimulate and enrich the debate on a number of practical as well as legal issues that have emerged during the practical implementation. It will be of interest to National Authorities and to diplomats following the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but also to practitioners in the chemical industry and related trade associations, international lawyers and political scientists - whether specialists or generalists, and the interested public.

In this volume security specialists, peace researchers, environmental scholars, demographers as well as climate, desertification, water, food and urbanisation specialists from the Middle East and North Africa, Europe and North America review security and conflict prevention in the Mediterranean. They also analyse NATO’s Mediterranean security dialogue and offer conceptualisations on security and perceptions of security challenges as seen in North and South. The latter half of the book analyses environmental security and conflicts in the Mediterranean and environmental consequences of World War II, the Gulf War, the Balkan wars and the Middle East conflict. It also examines factors of global environmental change: population growth, climate change, desertification, water scarcity, food and urbanisation issues as well as natural disasters. Furthermore, it draws conceptual conclusions for a fourth phase of research on human and environmental security and peace as well as policy conclusions for cooperation and partnership in the Mediterranean in the 21st century.

The United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating nuclear arms control agreements for over twenty years, yet radical differences remain in the two sides' concept of, and approaches to, strategic stability and arms control. This book compares and contrasts those approaches, using START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) as a case study. Throughout two decades of negotiation, U.S. policy has been directed toward dialogue that would encourage convergence of American and Soviet thought on nuclear deterrence. In Kartchner's view, that hope is belied not only by continuing asymmetries in the development and deployment of their strategic nuclear arsenals, but by differing U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions. The Reagan administration viewed START as a means of repudiating SALT II, restoring a measure of balance in the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition, and as a way of closing the so-called window of vulnerability. In contrast, Kartchner analyzes the Soviets' differing views of nuclear balance, emphasizing their satisfaction with SALT II and a strategic equilibrium shaped by a decade of bilateral arms control. Kartchner offers a detailed exposition of the major negotiating issues in START, contrasting concerns of U.S. and Soviet negotiators. Not surprisingly, each side's agenda was dominated by weapon systems that figure prominently in the other's development program. The author concludes by summarizing and comparing American and Soviet quests for stability and drawing up an assessment of U.S. efforts in both SALT and START to use arms control negotiations as a kind of classroom for instructing Soviet officials in American notions of "stabilizing" versus "destabilizing" weapon technology and America's own ethnocentric view of stability. START will profoundly affect the acquisition, operation, maintenance, and cost of U.S. strategic nuclear forces well into the next century. The history and analysis presented here will provide an essential source to policymakers and students of military-political relations for much-needed further study of this treaty's implications.

Fifty years into the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, the risks of nuclear war, terrorism, and the threat of further proliferation remain. A lack of significant progress towards disarmament will cast doubt upon the viability of the NPT. By recognizing that certain fissile materials are essential to every nuclear weapon and that controlling their usage provides the foundation for international efforts to limit their spread, this book presents a comprehensive framework for nuclear disarmament. Based upon phased reductions, Shea provides a mechanism for the disposal of weapon-origin fissile material and controls on peaceful nuclear activities and non-explosive military uses. He explores the technological means for monitoring and verification, the legal arrangements required to provide an enduring foundation, and a financial structure which will enable progress. This book will be invaluable to professional organizations, arms control NGOs, government officials, scientists, and politicians. It will also appeal to academics and postgraduate researchers working on security studies, disarmament diplomacy and the politics and science of verification.