This paper takes a fresh look at the purpose and modalities of conditionality for the use of the Fund’s resources. It is part of a broader review of Fund lending facilities that includes access levels, charges and maturities, the analytical basis for Fund lending, and facilities for low income countries. It aims to explore options for more flexible approaches that would be responsive to the changing needs and circumstances of the Fund’s members while providing adequate safeguards for Fund resources. While these options have been developed with General Resources Account (GRA) facilities in mind as a complement to the companion paper on the analytical framework, they could apply, as appropriate, to facilities and instruments used by low income members.

With single-digit inflation and substantial financial deepening, developing countries are adopting more flexible and forward-looking monetary policy frameworks and ascribing a greater role to policy interest rates and inflation objectives. While some countries have adopted formal inflation targeting regimes, others have developed frameworks with greater target flexibility to accommodate changing money demand, use of policy rates to signal the monetary policy stance, and implicit inflation targets.

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) considered a series of papers to reform the Fund's nonconcessional lending framework. This culminated in the approval of a major overhaul of the IMF’s lending framework, including the creation of a new Flexible Credit Line (FCL). The changes to the IMF’s lending framework which are described in GRA Lending Toolkit and Conditionality—Reform Proposalsand GRA Lending Toolkit and Conditionality—Reform Proposals—Revised Proposed Decisions include: • modernizing IMF conditionality for all borrowers, • introducing a new Flexible Credit Line, • enhancing the flexibility of the Fund’s traditional stand-by arrangement, • doubling normal access limits for nonconessional resources, • simplifying cost and maturity structures, and • eliminating certain seldom-used facilities. The series of papers are: Review of Fund Facilities—Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, Conditionality in fund-Supported Programs—Purposes, Modalities and Options for Reform, Charges and Maturities and Proposals for Reform, Supplement 1 and Supplement 2, Review of Fund Facilities—Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, and Review of Limits on Access to Financing in the Credit Tranches and Under the Extended Fund Facility, and Overall Access Limits Under the General Resources Account provide the background on the earlier discussion of reforms in each of these areas.

In discussing the June 2014 paper, Executive Directors broadly supported staff’s proposal to introduce more flexibility into the Fund’s exceptional access framework to reduce unnecessary costs for the member, its creditors, and the overall system. Directors’ views varied on staff’s proposal to eliminate the systemic exemption introduced in 2010. Many Directors favored removing the exemption but some others preferred to retain it and requested staff to consult further with relevant stakeholders on possible approaches to managing contagion. This paper offers specific proposals on how the Fund’s policy framework could be changed, presents staff’s analysis on the specific issue of managing contagion, and addresses some implementation issues. No Board decision is proposed at this stage. The paper is consistent with the Executive Board’s May 2013 endorsement of a work program focused on strengthening market-based approaches to resolving sovereign debt crises.

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The Fund regularly assesses conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with the next formal review planned for 2011. This paper summarizes previous assessments of conditionality, outlines staff’s proposed approach to the forthcoming review, and seeks Directors’ early views on the approach.

As a follow-up to the Executive Board's May 2013 discussion, this paper considers a possible direction for reform of the Fund's lending framework in the context of sovereign debt vulnerabilities. The primary focus of this paper relates to the Fund's exceptional access framework, since it is in this context that the Fund will most likely have to make the difficult judgment as to whether the member's problems can be resolved with or without a debt restructuring. The objective of the preliminary approaches set forth in this paper is to reduce the costs of crisis resolution for both creditors and debtors—relative to the alternatives—thereby benefitting the overall system. These ideas are market-based and their eventual implementation would require meaningful consultation with creditors.