Fund member countries that adopt market-friendly policies often encounter a credibility problem—market-friendly policies are not effective in stimulating private investment as long as there remains a significant risk of policy reversal. The root of this risk lies in the discretionary policy-making authority of governments. Committing to a program with the Fund, and endorsing its conditionality, is one instrument available to governments to overcome this difficulty. The paper develops this interpretation of conditionality and indicates some of its operational implications for Fund programs.

Annotation This book brings together different perspectives on the role of conditionality, drawing on the experiences and lessons learned by the donor community, NGO critics and academic circles, and the borrowing countries, and provides a board overview of contemporary approaches to conditionality in today's aid architecture.

With the end of the Cold War, the International Monetary Fund emerged as the most powerful international institution in history. But how much influence can the IMF exert over fiercely contested issues in domestic politics that affect the lives of millions? In Lending Credibility, Randall Stone develops the first systematic approach to answering this question. Deploying an arsenal of methods from a range of social sciences rarely combined, he mounts a forceful challenge to conventional wisdom. Focusing on the former Soviet bloc, Stone finds that the IMF is neither as powerful as some critics fear, nor as weak as others believe, but that the answer hinges on the complex factor of how much credibility it can muster from country to country. Stone begins by building a formal, game-theoretic model of lending credibility, which he then subjects to sophisticated quantitative testing on original data from twenty-six countries over the 1990s. Next come detailed, interview-based case studies on negotiations between the IMF and Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Bulgaria. Stone asserts that the IMF has exerted startling influence over economic policy in smaller countries, such as Poland and Bulgaria. However, where U.S. foreign policy interests come more heavily into play, as in Russia, the IMF cannot credibly commit to enforcing the loans-for-policy contract. This erodes its ability to facilitate enduring market reforms. Stone's context is the postcommunist transition in Europe and Asia, but his findings carry implications for IMF activities the world over.

Increasingly integrated global financial markets have been shaken by a series of severe shocks in recent decades, from Mexico’s Tequila crisis to the upheavals in the Eurozone. These crises have demonstrated that signs of uncertain local economic and political conditions can result in market fluctuations which in turn cause economic, social, and political instability. Such instability is particularly severe for developing countries that rely heavily on international financial markets for their financial needs. Building credibility in these markets is therefore important for national governments who wish to prevent market panic and capital flight and, ultimately, to achieve stable economic growth. Earlier studies have argued that institutional arrangements that constrain governments and commit them to protecting private property rights and market-friendly policies can send a strong positive signal to the markets about a given country’s sovereign credibility. This book argues, however, that the market perception of such credibility-building institutions is significantly contingent on which party governs the country. Formal institutions confer significant credibility-building effects on left-wing governments, whereas less or no significant effects are enjoyed by right-wing governments. And beyond that, any significant changes in a country’s institutional landscape—such as a breakdown of democracy or joining an international organization that can influence domestic politics—have particularly strong impact on the credibility of left-wing governments. This argument is supported by a quantitative analysis of sovereign credit ratings data collected from around 90 developing countries from 1980 to 2007, by case studies from South Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, and by face-to-face interviews with 24 financial market experts based in Hong Kong, Seoul, and Paris.

The book sheds new light on the history of the Eurozone crisis and provides crucial lessons for the way forward.

Nations with credible monetary regimes borrow at lower interest rates in international markets and are less likely to suffer speculative attacks and currency crises. While scholars typically attribute credibility to domestic institutions or international agreements, Jana Grittersová argues that when reputable multinational banks headquartered in Western Europe or North America open branches and subsidiaries within a nation, they enhance that nation’s monetary credibility. These banks enhance credibility by promoting financial transparency in the local system, improving the quality of banking regulation and supervision, and by serving as private lenders of last resort. Reputable multinational banks provide an enforcement mechanism for publicized economic policies, signaling to international financial markets that the host government is committed to low inflation and stable currency. Grittersová examines actual changes in government behavior of nations trying to gain legitimacy in international financial markets, and the ways in which perceptions of these nations change in relation to multinational banks. In addition to quantitative analysis of over 80 emerging-market countries, she offers extensive case studies of credibility building in the transition countries of Eastern Europe, Argentina in 2001, and the global financial crisis of 2008. Grittersová illuminates the complex interactions between multinational banks and national policymaking that characterize the process of financial globalization to reveal the importance of market confidence in a world of mobile capital.

The International Monetary Fund has been criticised from both the right and the left of the political spectrum with the right arguing that it is too interventionist and creates more problems than it solves and the left on occasion demanding that it be abolished altogether. What seems almost beyond question is that the IMF needs to be reformed. Defining a future role for the IMF will always be a controversial issue, but vital to any considerations will be a measured assessment of how it has operated in the past. This excellent new book from an internationally respected expert on the IMF intends to do just that. Starting with an historical background tracing the evolution of the IMF, the book goes on to cover such themes as: *The circumstances under which countries turn to the IMF *The various aspects of IMF conditionality *Institutional issues such as lending facilities and how the fund is resourced. Bringing together an array of articles, this excellent new book will undoubtedly be required reading for anyone with a serious interest in development studies as well as being an eye-opening read for policy makers involved with the IMF.