A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.

"The integration of economics and psychology has created a vibrant and fruitful emerging field of study. The essays in Economics and Psychology take a broad view of the interface between these two disciplines, going beyond the usual focus on "behavioral economics." As documented in this volume, the influence of psychology on economics has been responsible for a view of human behavior that calls into question the assumption of complete rationality (and raises the possibility of altruistic acts), the acceptance of experiments as a valid method of economic research, and the idea that utility or well-being can be measured. The contributors, all leading researchers in the field, offer state-of-the-art discussions of such topics as pro-social behavior and the role of conditional cooperation and trust, happiness research as an empirical tool, the potential of neuroeconomics as a way to deepen understanding of individual decision making, and procedural utility as a concept that captures the well-being people derive directly from the processes and conditions leading to outcomes. Taken together, the essays in Economics and Psychology offer an assessment of where this new interdisciplinary field stands and what directions are most promising for future research, providing a useful guide for economists, psychologists, and social scientists."--Descripción del editor.

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group. Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing.)

This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. The book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others.

In Cooperation among Nations, Joseph M. Grieco offers a provocative answer to a fundamental question in world politics: How does the anarchical nature of the international system inhibit the willingness of states to work together even when they share common interests? Grieco examines the capacity of two leading contemporary theories—modem political realism and the newest liberal institutionalism—to explain national responses to the non-tariff barrier codes negotiated during the Tokyo Round of international trade talks. According to his interpretation of realist theory, Grieco characterizes states as "defensive positionalists." As such, they often fail to cooperate because they fear that a joint endeavor, while producing positive gains for all participants, might also generate disparities in gains among the partners involved. Grieco demonstrates that this realist concept of defensive state positionalism gives rise to a better understanding of the systemic constraints on international collaboration and of the impact of anarchy on states than is offered by neoliberal institutionalism. Drawing on previously unreported archival materials, Grieco rigorously applies the two theories to an empirical analysis of the cooperative efforts of the United States and the European Community during the 1980s to regulate and reduce non-tariff trade barriers through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

This book surveys current conceptual, theoretical, and methodological approaches to global climate change and international relations. Although it focuses on the role of states, it also examines the role of nonstate actors and international organizations whenever state-centric explanations are insufficient.The book begins with a discussion of environmental constraints on human activities, the environmental consequences of human activities, and the history of global climate change cooperation. It then moves to an analysis of the global climate regime from various conceptual and theoretical perspectives. These include realism and neorealism, historical materialism, neoliberal institutionalism and regime theory, and epistemic community and cognitive approaches. Stressing the role of nonstate actors, the book looks at the importance of the domestic-international relationship in negotiations on climate change. It then looks at game-theoretical and simulation approaches to the politics of global climate change. It emphasizes questions of equity and the legal difficulties of implementing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. It concludes with a discussion of global climate change and other aspects of international relations, including other global environmental accords and world trade. The book also contains Internet references to major relevant documents.

An account of many experiments in which the psychological game Prisoner's Dilemma was played