Master's Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Politics - Region: Far East, Quaid I Azam University (Department of Defense and Strategic Studies), course: Seminar on Cureent Issues, language: English, abstract: The researcher has tried to look into the issue of the Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets objectively. The day Pakistan has become the nuclear power; it has been under stressful situation. It has to face different threats, from inside as well as from outside. Pakistan, being the sole Muslim nuclear power, has perturbed the sleep of many foreign forces. She is the target of different open and concealed intrigues which are weakening her stance on nuclear issue. Pakistan possesses a full range of activities relating to nuclear weapons. It is capable to produce heavy water, enrich uranium and plutonium and manufacture nuclear weapons. It has also a full developed missile program. No doubt they are great assets and contribute much to buttress the defence of Pakistan. But at the same time, she is in the hot water for committing the dauntless deed of having a nuclear arsenal. However, some un-thoughtful acts of nuclear proliferation and rise of militancy have raised many concerns about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear asset. Unfortunately, the northern areas of Pakistan are the bedrock of Al-Qaeda’s militants. These militants claim of having nuclear material. All these factors are seen as great threat for world peace. Post 9/11 scenario has created an upheaval in our social, cultural, political and economic set-up. The clue of any terror event that takes place anywhere in the world is traced back in Pakistan. Therefore, the world powers express their deep anxiety regarding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. These fears and anxieties are not baseless. A. Q. Khan Network’s involvement in nuclear proliferation and secondly some of our scientists alleged meeting with Osama-bin-Laden have raised many questions regarding the security of Pakistan’s assets. A gory wave of terrorism has grilled the country. Extremism and sectarianism have distorted the pretty face of Islam and Pakistan. Different terrorist groups have been playing a ruinous game in the name of Jihad. They are hell-bent to disparage the integrity of Pakistan. These are the facts and call for serious and effective steps by the stakeholders to foil all these dirty designs. Any laxity in this matter would be very fatal for the life of Pakistan. America and other world powers have been forcing Pakistan to sign CTBT and NPT. These powers have been urging Pakistan to cap her nuclear programme. India-Israel malicious designs about Pakistan’s nuclear program are an open secret.

Pakistan¿s nuclear arsenal consists of approx. 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its ¿minimum credible deterrent¿ is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Contents of this report: Background; Nuclear Weapons; Responding to India?; Delivery Vehicles; Nuclear Doctrine; Command and Control; Security Concerns; Proliferation Threat; and Pakistan¿s Response to the Proliferation Threat.

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles. Pakistan reportedly stores its warheads unassembled with the fissile core separate from non-nuclear explosives, and these are stored separately from their delivery vehicles. Pakistan does not have a stated nuclear policy, but its minimum credible deterrent is thought to be primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Command and control structures have been dramatically overhauled since September 11, 2001 and export controls and personnel security programs have been put in place since the 2004 revelations about Pakistan's top nuclear scientists, A.Q. Khan's international proliferation network. Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials and improve its nuclear security. A number of important initiatives such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved the security situation in recent years. Current instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, it is uncertain what impact continued instability in the country will have on these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan - U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.

Raise the issue of Pakistan's nuclear program before almost any group of Western security analysts, and they are likely to throw up their hands. What might happen if the current Pakistani government is taken over by radicalized political forces sympathetic to the Taliban? Such a government, they fear, might share Pakistan's nuclear weapons materials and know-how with others, including terrorist organizations. Then there is the possibility that a more radical government might pick a war again with India. Could Pakistan prevail against India's superior conventional forces without threatening to resort to nuclear arms? If not, what, if anything, might persuade Pakistan to stand its nuclear forces down? There are no good answers to these questions and even fewer near or mid-term fixes against such contingencies. This, in turn, encourages a kind of policy fatalism with regard to Pakistan. This book, which reflects research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center commissioned over the last 2 years, takes a different tack. Instead of asking questions that have few or no good answers, this volume tries to characterize specific nuclear problems that the ruling Pakistani government faces with the aim of establishing a base line set of challenges for remedial action. Its point of departure is to consider what nuclear challenges Pakistan will face if moderate forces remain in control of the government and no hot war breaks out against India. A second volume of commissioned research planned for publication in 2008 will consider how best to address these challenges. What proliferation risks might the current government still be tempted to take? What is required of Pakistan to maintain nuclear deterrence with India? What new vulnerabilities will the expansion of Pakistan's civilian nuclear sector require Islamabad to attend to? Finally, how daunting a task might it be to keep Pakistan's nuclear weapons assets from being seized or to take them back after having been seized? Each of these questions is tackled in the chapters that follow. Along the way, a number of interesting discoveries are made. First, from the historical analyses done by Bruno Tetrais and George Perkovich, we learn that despite the significant nuclear export control efforts of the current Pakistani government, it might well proliferate again. Why? The same reasons that previous Pakistani governments tolerated and, at times, even sanctioned the nuclear-rocket export-import activities of Dr. A. Q. Khan: Perceived strategic abandonment by the United States, lack of financing for its own strategic competition against India, insufficient civilian oversight of a politically influential military and intelligence services, and a perceived need to deflect negative international attention from Pakistan to third countries.(See Table 1 at the end of this chapter for a historical review.) One or more of these factors were in play throughout the last 3 decades. Two still are. Certainly, the United States has done all it can to reassure Pakistani officials about Washington's commitment to Pakistan's security. Yet, there still is Pakistani cause for concern. Might Washington tie future security and economic assistance to Pakistani progress toward democratic elections and cracking down more severely against radical Islamic groups in Pakistan? As for the matter of being isolated, Pakistan now has to be concerned not just about maintaining good relations with Washington, but somehow fending off the encircling efforts of India.

In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to support the military dominated government of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country s nuclear proliferation activities, The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States cast into sharp relief two long-standing contradictions in U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in over fifty years, the United States and Pakistan have never been able to align their national security objectives except partially and temporarily. Pakistan s central goal has been to gain U.S. support to bolster its security against India, whereas the United States has tended to view the relationship from the perspective of its global security interests. Second, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) repeatedly have been subordinated to other U.S. goals. During the 1980s, Pakistan successfully exploited its importance as a conduit for aid to the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to deter the application of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law. Not only did Pakistan develop its nuclear weapons capability while receiving some $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid, but some of the erstwhile mujahidin came to form the core of Al Qaeda and Taliban a decade later. Congress has endorsed and funded for FY2005 a request from the Bush Administration for a new five-year, $3 billion, package of U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Some Members of Congress and policy analysts have expressed concern that once again the United States will be constrained from addressing serious issues concerning Pakistan s nuclear activities by the need for Islamabad s help this time to capture or kill members of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.