This book explores the morality of compromising. The author argues that peace and public justification are values that provide moral reasons to make compromises in politics, including compromises that establish unjust laws or institutions. He explains how it is possible to have moral reasons to agree to moral compromises and he debates our moral duties and obligations in making such compromises. The book also contains discussions of the sources of the value of public justification, the relation between peace and justice, the nature of modus vivendi arrangements and the connections between compromise, liberal institutions and legitimacy. In exploring the morality of compromising, the book thus provides some outlines for a map of political morality beyond justice.

Is the purpose of political philosophy to articulate the moral values that political regimes would realize in a virtually perfect world and show what that implies for the way we should behave toward one another? That model of political philosophy, driven by an effort to draw a picture of an ideal political society, is familiar from the approach of John Rawls and others. Or is political philosophy more useful if it takes the world as it is, acknowledging the existence of various morally non-ideal political realities, and asks how people can live together nonetheless? The latter approach is advocated by “realist” thinkers in contemporary political philosophy. In Value, Conflict, and Order, Edward Hall builds on the work of Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, and Bernard Williams in order to establish a political realist’s theory of politics for the twenty-first century. The realist approach, Hall argues, helps us make sense of the nature of moral and political conflict, the ethics of compromising with adversaries and opponents, and the character of political legitimacy. In an era when democratic political systems all over the world are riven by conflict over values and interests, Hall’s conception is bracing and timely.

Distributive justice is one of the most discussed topics in political philosophy. Focusing on the plurality of irreconcilable conceptions of social and political justice, this book presents an array of new perspectives on the topic. Bringing together 30 original essays of well-established and young international scholars, the volume is essential reading for anyone interested in social and political justice.

Until recently, discussions of compromise have been largely absent in political theory. However, political theorists have become increasingly interested in understanding the practice and justification of compromise in politics. This interest is connected to the increased concern with pluralism and disagreement. Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory provides a critical discussion of when and to what extent compromise is the best response to pluralism and disagreement in democratic decision-making and beyond. Christian F. Rostbøll and Theresa Scavenius draw together the work of ten established and emerging scholars to provide different perspectives on compromise. Organized into four parts, the book begins by discussing the justification and limits of compromise. Part 2 discusses the practice of compromise and considers the ethics required for compromise as well as the institutions that facilitate compromise. Part 3 focuses on pluralism and connects the topic of compromise to current discussions in political theory on public reason, political liberalism, and respect for diversity. Part 4 discusses different challenges to compromise in the context of the current political environment. The book will be of interest to a wide range of scholars in the social sciences, philosophy, and law. It will be useful in introducing scholars to a variety of approaches to compromise and as readings for graduate courses in political theory and political philosophy, ethics, the history of ideas, and the philosophy of law.

This book provides an interdisciplinary examination of the relationship between compromise and democracy. Compromises have played a significant role in our representative democracies and yet the nature of the relationship between compromise and democracy has generally raised tricky theoretical questions and generated ambiguous evaluations. This book focuses on the relationship between compromise and liberal democracies from both a cultural and institutional perspective and addresses new and lesser-explored aspects of the relationship. It explores a variety of topics including: compromise and in-commensurable values, antagonist paradigms, compromise and majority decisions, compromise and publicity, compromise and post-conflict societies, compromise and anti-system political parties, and compromise and the understanding of political representation. Compromises in Democracy offers an original perspective on the topic by assembling contributions from the fields of philosophy, sociology, political theory, political science and history of ideas.

This book investigates the unresolved issue of democratic legitimacy in contexts of pervasive disagreement and contributes to this debate by defending a relational version of political liberalism that rests on the ideal of co-authorship. According to this proposal, democratic legitimacy depends upon establishing appropriate interactions among citizens who ought to ascribe to one another the status of putative practical and epistemic authorities. To support this relational reading of political liberalism, the book proposes a revised account of the civic virtue of reasonableness along with an investigation of the epistemic-specific dimension of political equality. By engaging with political epistemology and social theory, this book explores ways to address inherent tensions within the liberal paradigm, using the following strategies of addressing these tensions: first, it defends a twofold model of legitimacy that distinguishes the goals, methodologies, and justificatory tasks of both ideal and nonideal phases of the two-level justificatory framework; second, it contends that democratic legitimacy requires an engaged and contextual critical appraisal of the injustices that characterize our daily social lives, illustrating how structural forms of injustice represent a profound betrayal of the liberal ideal of democratic legitimacy.

This is the fifth volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Since its revival in the 1970s political philosophy has been a vibrant field in philosophy, one that intersects with jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory. OSPP aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in political philosophy and these closely related subfields. This volume features seven papers that address a range of central topics and represent cutting edge work in the field. They are divided into two parts that explore issues relating to power and legitimacy, and to political, legal, and moral relations.