A brief historical and analytical understanding of the difficulties encountered in negotiating and implementing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and their implications for efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Includes full text of the treaty and supplementary materials.

On September 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty at the United Nations Headquarters. Over the next five months, 141 nations, including the four other nuclear weapon statesâ€"Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdomâ€"added their signatures to this total ban on nuclear explosions. To help achieve verification of compliance with its provisions, the treaty specifies an extensive International Monitoring System of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasonic, and radionuclide sensors. This volume identifies specific research activities that will be needed if the United States is to effectively monitor compliance with the treaty provisions.

Based on extensive research in government archives and private papers, this book analyzes the secret debate within the Eisenhower administration over the pursuit of a nuclear test-ban agreement. In contrast to much recent scholarship, this study concludes that Eisenhower strongly desired to reach an accord with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to cease nuclear weapons testing. For Eisenhower, a test ban would ease Cold War tensions, slow the nuclear arms race, and build confidence toward disarmament; however, he faced continual resistance from his early scientific advisers, most notably Lewis L. Strauss and Edward Teller. Extensive research into previously unavailable government archival sources and collections of private manuscripts reveals the manipulative acts of test-ban opponents and other factors that inhibited Eisenhower s actions throughout his presidency. Meticulously analyzed, these sources underscore Eisenhower's dependence on the counsel of his science advisors, such as Strauss, James R. Killian, and George B. Kistiakowsky, to determine the course he pursued in regard to several components of his national security strategy. In addition to its comprehensive analysis of the test-ban debate, this book makes important contributions to the scholarly literature assessing Eisenhower's leadership and his approach to arms control. "

The contributors to this book describe, discuss, and evaluate the normative reframing brought about by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty), taking you on a journey through its genesis and negotiation history to the shape of the emerging global nuclear order. Adopted by the United Nations on 7 July 2017, the Ban Treaty came into effect on 22 January 2021. For advocates and supporters, weapons that were always immoral are now also illegal. To critics, it represents a profound threat to the stability of the existing global nuclear order with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as the normative anchor. As the most significant leap in nuclear disarmament in fifty years and a rare case study of successful state-civil society partnership in multilateral diplomacy, the Ban Treaty challenges the established order. The book’s contributors are leading experts on the Ban Treaty, including senior scholars, policymakers and civil society activists. A vital guide to the Ban Treaty for students of nuclear disarmament, arms control and diplomacy as well as for policymakers in those fields.

There Has Been A Lively Debate, For The Last Three Years, On The Question Whether Or Nor India Should Sign The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty [Ctbt]. In Spite Of Great Importance Of The Subject For National Security, The Full Text Of Ctbt Is Not Easily Available. The Present Book Fulfills This Gap. This Will Enable The Experts And The Common Man To Have Better Understanding Of The On-Going Debate On The Subject. The Editor Contends That India Should Not Sign Such A Discriminatory And Inequitable Treaty. Signing Of Such A Treaty Would Hinder India S Efforts To Safeguard Its Security.It Is Hoped That The Book Would Be Of Great Value To The Researchers And Students Of Defence Studies, Parliamentarians, Senior Executives Concerned With Defence And The Common Readers.

How can countries verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and detect and deter violations? It is in their interest to increase their verification readiness because the assessment of compliance with the treaty rests with states parties to the CTBT. The treaty provides countries with two verification elements: an international system of monitoring stations, and an on-site inspection regime. The monitoring system can detect nuclear explosions underground, in the atmosphere and under water. This book provides incentives to nations around the world on how they can organize their efforts to verify compliance with the CTBT and how they can collaborate with other countries, perhaps on a regional basis, to monitor areas of concern. Such focused efforts can improve their detection and deterrence capabilities through precision monitoring. The book addresses the CTBT verification from the perspective of countries. It shows how they can create the essential tools for the assessment of the large amounts of data available from the verification regime and other sources, including observations from satellites and thousands of stations outside of the treaty regime. Countries can also use current scientific and technological developments to assist them in verifying compliance with the treaty. The book offers political and scientific analysis on the evolution of the treaty over the years. The book is intended for professionals in the political, diplomatic, scientific and military fields who deal with international security, non-proliferation and arms control. It is also intended for non-governmental organizations and journalists seeking a better understanding of the nuclear test ban issue and how states can verify compliance with the treaty.

"This is one of the most important books to come from a university press within the last year . . . Seaberg, Nobel Prize laureate, was chairman of the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) when the treaty was negotiated. With a decent time interval now past, he has opened the detailed diary he kept during his AEC tenure. Together with auxiliary materials, including interviews with other participants, he has now written an incisive account of events leading up to the treaty and of the negotiations and their successful conclusion."--Christian Science Monitor "Drawn from [Seaberg's] personal journal, this book focuses on Kennedy's quest for a comprehensive test ban and on why, 'despite some near misses, this glittering prize, which carried with it the opportunity to arrest the viciously spiralling arms race, eluded our grasp.' More than a memoir, the book draws upon documents and observations of other key participants .. . It also provides insights into Kennedy and his Administration as well as giving us the substance of the nuclear test ban debate. Mr. Seaberg is refreshingly fair in his assessment of the merits and failures of the limited treaty that Kennedy achieved."--New York Times "A detailed and absorbing history of what seems, in retrospect, the innocent and halcyon days of nuclear arms control. Seaberg rightly lays claim to having been an 'insider' in the test ban negotiations, and his first-person account benefits from close friendship with other Kennedy insiders . . . As might be expected, the book is most interesting for the light it throws upon the thoughts and actions of Kennedy; a surprise is its insight, reflected through the eyes of Kennedy and Harriman, into the personality of Khrushchev. . . Implicit in Seaborg's portrait of Khrushchev is a view which perhaps had some currency in the Kennedy administration but more recently seems to have fallen out of vogue--that it is possible to deal with the Russians."--Washington Post