GAO-01-301R Information Related to the Scope and Complexity of the Federal Tax System

Simplicity in taxation has considerable potential advantages. However, attempts to simplify tax systems are only likely to be successful and enduring if they take account of the reasons why taxation is complex. There are strong pressures on tax systems to accommodate a range of important factors, as well as complex and changing national and international environments within which modern tax systems have to operate. This book explores the experiences of simplification in a range of countries and jurisdictions. The authors analyse a range of manifestations of simplification, including tax systems, tax law, taxpayer communications and tax administration. They also review the longer term or more fundamental approaches to simplification, suggesting that in order to strike the optimum balance between simplicity and the aims of a tax system in terms of efficiency and equity, a range of complex environmental factors must all be taken into account. With chapters reflecting on experiences from Australia, China, Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the UK and the US, the authors illustrate differences between jurisdictions and the changing environment in which they operate. This book addresses the crucial balance between simplicity and the other objectives of tax design and reform, and suggests that reformers of the tax system should include simplicity as one of the key evaluators of any design or reform proposal.

People pay taxes for two reasons. On the positive side, most people recognize, even if grudgingly, that payment of tax is a duty of citizenship. On the negative side, they know that the law requires payment, that evasion is a crime, and that willful failure to pay taxes is punishable by fines or imprisonment. The practical questions for tax administration are how to strengthen each of these motives to comply with the law. How much should be spent on enforcement and how should enforcement be organized to promote these objectives and achieve the best results per dollar spent? Over the last few years, the U.S. Congress has restricted spending on tax administration, forcing the Internal Revenue Service to curtail enforcement activities, at the same time, that the number of individual filers has increased, tax rules have become more complex, and more business have become multinational operations. But if too many cases of tax evasion go undetected and unpunished, those who may have grudgingly paid their taxes may soon find it easier to join the scofflaws. These events in combination have created a genuine crisis in tax administration. The chapters in this volume evaluate the capacity of authorities to enforce the tax laws in a modern, global economy and examine the implications of failing to do so. Specific aspects of tax law, including tax shelters, issues relating to small businesses, tax software, role of tax preparers, and the objectives of tax simplification are examined in detail. The volume also builds a conceptual basis for future scholarship, with regard not only to tax administration, but also to such fundamental questions as whether taxpayers respond mostly to economic incentives or are influenced by their experiences with the filing process and what is the proper framework for evaluating the allocation of resources within the IRS.

An approach to taxation that goes beyond an emphasis on tax rates to consider such aspects as administration, compliance, and remittance. Despite its theoretical elegance, the standard optimal tax model has significant limitations. In this book, Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer argue that tax analysis must move beyond the emphasis on optimal tax rates and bases to consider such aspects of taxation as administration, compliance, and remittance. Slemrod and Gillitzer explore what they term a tax-systems approach, which takes tax evasion seriously; revisits the issue of remittance, or who writes the check to cover tax liability (employer or employee, retailer or consumer); incorporates administrative and compliance costs; recognizes a range of behavioral responses to tax rates; considers nonstandard instruments, including tax base breadth and enforcement effort; and acknowledges that tighter enforcement is sometimes a more socially desirable way to raise revenue than an increase in statutory tax rates. Policy makers, Slemrod and Gillitzer argue, would be well advised to recognize the interrelationship of tax rates, bases, enforcement, and administration, and acknowledge that tax policy is really tax-systems policy.