In 1992, presidential hopeful William Jefferson Clinton, in what Warren Christopher called the toughest foreign policy rhetoric of the campaign, criticized then President Bush for failing to tie China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to its human rights record. In 1994, despite its poor progress in human rights issues, President Clinton announced his intention to support continuation of China's MFN status. This paper examines this sea change in the Clinton presidency. It studies why this potential superpower rival was awarded MFN status despite legitimate concerns and President Clinton's best intentions to the contrary. It also critiques the Governmental Politics model with respect to this decision and finally, proposes a new decision process model to evaluate economic, political and contextual influences on government decisions.

The October 1997 United States visit and summit between Chinese President Jiang Zemin and US President William J. Clinton yielded concentrated, daily, and prominent debate on the status of US-China relations Despite ongoing investigation into Democratic National Committee soft money practices, and the criticism that "Chinese campaign money may be Influencing US policy, "1 the President stands firmly by his 29 May 1997 decision to continue China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) Status waiver and a more moderated approach to US-China relations US-China policy critics, such as Bill Bauer, president of the Washington DC based Family Research Council, mounted a prominent campaign during the week of the summit. Citing continued human rights violations, religious persecution, trade inequities, and intellectual property rights differences as overwhelming justification for MFN revocation, critics, including Congress, called for a tougher stand. The opposition repeatedly raised the issue of US policy towards China, and the US President, as being subservient to big business and political monetary gain rather than national interest or principle. It is this issue that merits further investigation.

On May 26, 1994, President Clinton announced his decision to renew "most-favored nation (MFN)" trade benefits for China and to "delink" China's progress on human rights from its eligibility for MFN status In explaining his decision, Clinton's ~justification echoed that previously advanced by President Bush, which then candidate Clinton had criticized as "coddling" Chinese dictators Now that he was President, Clinton decided to cast aside both his campaign rhetoric and his 1993 Executive Order that had formally tied MFN to human rights This essay will examine the reasons behind Clinton's policy reversal.

Addressing the critical issues where commercializm and human rights converge, this insightful addition to the literature on US foreign policy on human rights makes a valuable contribution to the field of international relations.