The aim of this research is to provide the basic parameters for a model for the definition of the relation between the general competition and sector specific frameworks and rules regarding the regulation of the Internal Energy Market, especially after the Third Energy Package. The research considers the recent sector specific framework in relation to a series of recent competition law cases of the Energy Market where structural remedies were applied under the commitments procedure. Essential facilities doctrine and generally competition law tools do not seem to provide a suitable framework for effectively addressing the dynamic competition concept, treating the issue of balancing incentives to invest with open market concept and designing solutions for the stable development of Energy Market infrastructure. Competition law provides ex post and case-by-case solutions, which lack the breadth of objectives expressed by sector regulation. On the other hand, sector regulation seems to incorporate competition rules and objectives, while the application of competition law in recent decisions did not seem to take into consideration present and forthcoming sector-specific context and parameters. However, competition law has a hierarchical priority over sector-specific rules and its direct application cannot be excluded when sector regulation is insufficient or is not applied efficiently. Sector rules should have a functional priority regarding their implementation as lex specialis and constitute the context for any potential application of competition law. Furthermore, structural interventions based on competition rules will abide by the principle of proportionality, only in specific cases where market organisation and poor regulatory supervision allow the continuation of high vertical integration and anticompetitive practices. There is also a need to establish an efficient model of clear allocation of duties between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators. The model proposed by the research emphasizes prioritization of sector-specific rules, use of competition rules as an interpretative tool, limitation of their independent application to cases where sector regulation fails and even then after taking into consideration sector specific context and acceptance of dynamic competition as an orientating framework for the regulation of the Internal Energy Market.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Europe has been struggling to establish a competitive as well as a fully integrated internal energy market. Until the early 1990s, the European energy markets consisted of national monopolies possessing vertically integrated structures. They were also still nationally segregated. Since, the EU has made the decision to open European energy markets to competition and subsequently establish an internal energy market. The European energy markets are currently controlled by a dual structure consisting of two different regulatory frameworks: competition law and sector-specific regulations. The primary goal of these legal instruments is the establishment of an internal energy market. This book aims at analysing the development of the European energy markets and policies from the perspective of competition law as well as sector-specific regulations and, hence, identifying the problems regarding the introduction of competition into the energy markets.

This paper aims at highlighting the Commission's approach towards the relation between sector specific regulation and general competition law, especially concerning energy markets and the road to Internal Market objective.We firstly present Trinko case, in order to focus on two crucial and relevant to our analysis issues: essential facilities doctrine and the relation between sector regulation and competition law. Our intention is to offer a basis for comparison and counterarguments concerning EU approach towards these issues. After showing how Trinko case addressed these issues, we examine the relevant points of view of European Competition Authorities and ECJ. Concerning Essential Facilities Doctrine, we show how a similar to the American approach was established and how Commission and ECJ eventually formed a very flexible -in comparison to the American- and open to third parties, system for access to facilities. Futhermore, we note that recent regulation - Third Energy Package - tries to address this issue by sector specific rules, instead of general antitrust law. One other major conclusion is that in EU, Commission applies competition law, in order to address issues fitting to sector regulation in a possibly stricter way than sector regulation does - for example Third Energy Package offers many alternatives to full ownership unbundling, while Commission's decisions actually present it as a single option; thus Commission tries to implement a sector specific policy by competition law means and methodology and especially by commitments procedure - a procedure that allows Commission to avoid ECJ investigation. We seek the reasons that lead to this approach and we highlight the weak points of it, while we also explain why far-reaching structural remedies may not be acceptable under competition law framework. We also use facts from other markets that opened to competition before energy, such as telecommunications, in order to recognise similar approaches and their results.Finally, we conclude that the recent Commission's approach may eventually lead to a dualistic system - possibly dangerous and inefficient as well - of addressing energy market's issues; a dualistic system that will fully reveal its possibly negative consequences after the Third Energy Package comes into force.

Recent years have seen a major growth in the European law concerning the operation of the energy industry, especially with respect to electricity and gas. Several directives have been adopted that are aimed at the promotion of competition in this key sector of the European economy. At thesame time, the jurisprudence of the European Court had developed further on matters such as access to networks, import and export monopolies and security of supply.In this book the authors examine the principal legislation, Treaty provisions and decisions of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the EU as they related to the promotion of competition in European energy markets. In particular, two chapters are devoted to a detailed analysis of theprovisions of the two directives that set out common rules for the creation of an internal market in the electricity and gas sectors. In each case, the analysis is set in the context of the various programmes of energy market liberalization and privatization in the Member States, which aresummarized in this book. However, the authors also take the wider pan-European context into account, explaining the requirements and the implications of the European Economic Area Agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty and the Europe Agreements with countries of Central and Eastern Europe.The approach adopted by the authors is both analytical and historical. They locate the legislation in the context of the EU Internal Market programme that began in the late 1980s and explain the roles played by the various parties (energy industries, consumers and EU institutions) in shaping thefinal legislation. Importantly, they explain how the framework character of the energy directives has led to further important rule-making in the implementation of the directives across the EU. They conclude that a co-ordinated response between the European Commission and the national regulatorswill be essential to resolve problems arising in the transition to a competitive energy market in the EU.

EU energy law and policy have become more and more complex in recent years. Today these areas feature a multitude of layers concerning not only regulation of the power industry, but also security of energy supply, climate change, consumer needs and technical innovation. This textbook serves as an introduction to this distinctive field. For readers without much experience with the EU, the author provides a separate chapter which outlines the institutional structure and functioning of the European Union in the field of energy policy. Tables of key court decisions and key legislation, review questions and further reading lists ultimately help to give readers a lasting impression of one of the most vibrant fields of EU law and policy.

Scientific Essay from the year 2014 in the subject Law - Civil / Private, Trade, Anti Trust Law, Business Law, grade: 2.0, Free University of Berlin, course: Master degree, language: English, abstract: Achieving a genuine internal energy market is a priority goal for the European Union. The internal energy market is made up of the European gas and electricity markets. It has been the subject of several successive sets of directives and regulations, grouped into “legislative packages”. There have been three such packages up to now, put together by the European Parliament and the European Union Council, which establish common rules for the internal energy market for all Member States. In 2007, the European Commission drew up an assessment report on the internal market based on a sector-specific survey of the gas and electricity markets. It concluded that there were still numerous deficiencies preventing both consumers and the industry from fully reaping the benefits of open national markets. The Commission then announced that a 3rd legislative package would be introduced to reinforce the rules so far adopted. The aim of 3rd Energy Package which was adopted in 2009 was to make the energy market fully effective and to create a single EU gas and electricity market. This would help to keep prices as low as possible and increase standards of service and security of supply. The most important proposal of the "3rd Energy Package" is "ownership unbundling" - separating the operation of gas pipelines and electricity networks from the business of providing gas or generating power. The purpose of ownership unbundling is to promote an open and transparent market, non-discriminatory access to networks and a level playing field. The idea is to combat cross-subsidization between generation/supply and networks, including exchange of strategic information, to ensure both undistorted competition in electricity and gas markets and sufficient investment in networks. Therefore, in order to value the importance of the Third energy package for ensuring effective competition the principles of ownership unbundling should be precisely discussed. Thus in the first part of this paper general information about Third Energy Package will be given and brief description of principles, benefits and deficits of the ownership unbundling will be discussed in the following parts respectively. The conclusion part answers the question whether existence of the ownership unbundling, as a main part of the 3rd Energy Package is sufficient to ensure effective competition or not.

øLaw and Policy of the European Gas Market explores the law and politics of the EU gas market and in particular, the regulatory and competitive choices of institutions and bodies operating on the market, with a view to achieving a higher level of marke