We investigate the relationship between competition and innovation using a dynamic oligopoly model that endogenizes both the long-run innovation rate and market structure. We use the model to examine how various determinants of competition, such as product substitutability, entry costs, and innovation spillovers, affect firms' equilibrium strategies for entry, exit, and investment in product quality. We find an inverted-U relationship between product substitutability and innovation: the returns to innovation initially rise for all firms but eventually, as the market approaches a winner-take-all environment, laggards have few profit scraps to fight over and give up pursuit of the leader, knowing he will defend his lead. The increasing portion of the inverted-U reflects changes in firm's investment policy functions, whereas the decreasing portion arises from the industry transiting to states with fewer firms and wider quality gaps. Allowing market structure to be endogenous yields different results compared to extant work that fixes the market structure.

This book reviews recent progress in the theory of oligopoly and market leadership and provides new results on the theory of Stackelberg competition and Nash competition with strategic investment under endogenous entry. These theories are applied to models of competition in quantities, prices and to patent races. The results are used to propose a new approach to competition policy and issues of the abuse of dominance.

"... papers presented to the international symposium "Oligopolies, Technological Innovation and International Competitiveness" organized by the Centre for Research on the Development of Industry and Technology (CREDIT) of the University of Quebec at Montreal in October 1987" -- Introd.

The book has three main objectives. Firstly, to provide an up-dated analysis of the most important theoretical developments, secondly, to present significant empirical verifications and thirdly, to assess the micro-macro debate and the relations which link the market structure to the function of the economic system.

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Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly.

Given a set of competing products, which are more likely to succeed? As decisive as it is for marketing scholars as well as managers, the answer to this question is also more than recondite thanks to the complex dynamics of rivalry among products. This complexity hinges primarily on the "interactive" nature of the competition, which renders the ultimate outcome of any strategic action contingent upon the way the competitors respond to that action. To elucidate the impact of interactive and coevolutionary dynamics in the competitiveness of products, this dissertation advances a stance based on a theory from evolutionary biology named the Red Queen Competition.