This book investigates the role of banking interest groups and lobbying in the making of the European Banking Union. Facing the politicization of financial regulation in the wake of the crisis, core players of the European banking industry managed to adapt and re-orient their lobbying resources and strategies to influence the reform process. This work advances an original Critical IPE approach, which combines structural power, the collective agency of key socio-economic groups and the issue salience as critical determinants to explain corporate influence in policy-making. The explanatory framework is applied to a comprehensive analysis, tracing the Banking Union’s development within the broader context of the EU post-crisis banking regulation. An in-depth scrutiny of the interest groups’ preferences, coalitions and attainments is thus provided on the pillars of the Banking Union, covering banking supervision, resolution, deposit insurance, as well as the reform of the banks’ prudential requirements and the failed project of an EU banking structural reform.

Thousands of lobbyists lobby decision-makers in Brussels every day, but little is known about their impact on policy. Lobbying in the European Union addresses this research gap and analyzes the conditions under which interest groups can successfully lobby the European institutions.

EU Lobbying: Empirical and Theoretical studies offers an analysis of large empirical studies of interest group politics and Lobbying in Europe. Recognising the continued European economic integration, globalisation and the changing role of the state, it observs significant adaptations in interest mobilisation and strategic behavour. This book assesses the logic of collective and direct action, the logic of access and influence, the logic of venue-shopping and alliance building. It addresses specific issues such as: the emergence of elite pluralism in EU institutions, the pump priming of political action by EU institutions, and the growing political sophistication of private and public interests in Brussels. Through these issues the book explores how interest groups lobby different European institutions along the policy process and how the nature of policy dictates the style and level of lobbying. This book was previously published as a special issue of Jounal of European Public Policy

In two volumes, this book covers in a comprehensive, internally balanced, systematic and detailed way the field of European Union (EU) banking law and regulation. In three parts, Volume I offers a brief introduction to the role of banks in the contemporary financial system and the theory of banking regulation, a thorough analysis of international financial standards which are contained in the sources of public international banking law (and of public international financial law, in general), a detailed presentation of the gradual evolution and the sources of EU banking law, as well as a precise analysis of the law-making process and the key institutional aspects of this branch of EU economic law. The standards and rules adopted and the institutions created in the aftermath of the (2007-2009) global financial crisis and the subsequent euro area fiscal crisis, as well as during the current pandemic crisis are discussed, as appropriate. A detailed analysis of the substantive aspects of EU banking law will follow in Volume II

Written by experts in the field, this volume offers an in-depth and forward-looking legal, economic, and political science analysis of the rationale, main features, as well as the shortcomings of European economic, monetary, and financial integration. It is primarily intended for an academic audience and policymakers.

The problem of banks being 'too big to fail' was the defining regulatory issue of the global financial crisis. However, attempts to tackle the problem by separating retail banking from higher risk trading activities - known as structural reform - proved to be highly divisive and contributed to significant regulatory divergence. In this book, David Howarth and Scott James explain this variation by examining the politics of bank structural reform across six key jurisdictions: the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Integrating political economy and public policy approaches, they develop a novel 'comparative financial power' framework to analyse how financial industry influence is mediated by two factors: first, whether bank lobbying is unified and centralized (cooperative financial power) or divided and fragmented (competitive financial power); and second, policy makers' use of venue shifting to depoliticize contentious policy issues. The book explains that the US and UK governments implemented major reforms because the banking industry was divided and faced significant opposition. However, venue shifting to an independent committee led to durable reform in the UK, while political polarization in the US contributed to contested reform. By contrast, the French and German governments balanced unified bank lobbying and political pressures to act by pursuing limited symbolic reforms; the Dutch government deflected the issue through delegation to multiple commissions (no reform); while political stalemate at the EU level resulted from early venue shifting and concerted pan-European bank lobbying. The book makes a major contribution to scholarship on the political economy of finance and business power.

What explains differences in the lobbying behaviour of interest groups? And what consequences do these differences have for the access that interest groups can gain to decision-makers and the influence that they can exert on policy outcomes? Building on an unprecedented amount of empirical evidence on lobbying in Europe, this book puts forward a distinction between lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders. Lobbying insiders, most prominently business interests, try to establish direct contacts with decision-makers, enjoy good access to executive institutions, and manage to shape policy outcomes when mobilizing the public on an issue is difficult. Lobbying outsiders, in particular citizen groups such as consumer, environmental or health non-governmental organizations, put greater emphasis on mobilizing the public or changing public attitudes, find it easier to gain access to legislative decision-makers, and have the greatest impact on outcomes on issues that are amenable to an outside lobbying campaign. The book shows that a single argument, building on group type as the main variable, can explain variation across interest groups in their choice of strategy, their access to decision-makers, and the conditions under which they can exert influence. The existence of lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders has important implications for both our understanding of political decision-making and the normative appraisal of contemporary democracy.