This paper reviews the recent literature on cross-border banking, with a focus on policy implications. Cross-border banking has increased sharply in recent decades, particularly in the form of entry, and has affected the development of financial systems, access to financial services, and stability. Reviewing the empirical literature, the author finds much, although not uniform, evidence that cross-border banking supports the development of an efficient and stable financial system that offers a wide access to quality financial services at low cost. But as better financial systems have more cross-border banking, the relationship between cross-border banking and competitiveness has to be carefully judged. While developing countries have some special conditions, provided a minimum degree of oversight is in place, they experience effects similar to industrial countries. There are some questions, though, on the effects of cross-border banking on lending based on softer information and on stability. Relevant experiences from capital markets show that the degree of cross-border financial activities can affect local market sustainability and there can be path dependency when opening up to cross-border competition. Reviewing the fast changing landscape of financial services provision, the author argues that cross-border banking highlights the increased importance of competition policy in financial services provision. This competition policy cannot be traditional, institutional based, but will need to resemble that used in other network industries. Furthermore, with globalization accelerating, competition policy will need to be global, supported by greater cross-border institutional collaboration and using the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) process and the disciplines of the World Trade Organization. GATS can be of special value to developing countries as it provides a binding, pro-competition framework that has proven more difficult to establish otherwise.

Cross-border banking, while having the potential for a more efficient financial sector, also creates potential challenges for bank supervisors and regulators. This volume discusses topics that include: the landscape of cross-border bank activity, the resulting competitive implications, emerging challenges for prudential regulation, and more. Cross-border banking, while having the potential for a more efficient financial sector, also creates potential challenges for bank supervisors and regulators. It requires cooperation by regulatory authorities across jurisdictions and a clear delineation of authority and responsibility. That delineation is typically not present and regulatory authorities often have significantly different incentives to respond when cross-border-active banks encounter difficulties. Most of these issues have only begun to be seriously evaluated. This volume, one of the first attempts to address these issues, brings together experts and regulators from different countries. The wide range of topics discussed include: the current landscape of cross-border bank activity, the resulting competitive implications, emerging challenges for prudential regulation, safety net concerns, failure resolution issues, and the potential future evolution of international banking.

Providing a comprehensive assessment of the strategies of banks and insurance companies in the move towards an internal European market for financial services, this book analyzes the latest theoretical and institutional developments. It also provides a range of case studies of actual cross-border entry strategies of some of the largest European financial institutions.

This report argues that policy reforms in micro- and macro-prudential regulation and macroeconomic policies are needed for Europe to reap the important diversification and efficiency benefits from cross-border banking, while reducing the risks stemming from large cross-border banks.Available online as pdf at: http: //www.cepr.org/pubs/books/CEPR/cross-border_banking.pd

This paper presents a stylized analysis of the effects of ring-fencing (i.e., different restrictions on cross-border transfers of excess profits and/or capital between a parent bank and its subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions) on cross-border banks. Using a sample of 25 large European banking groups with subsidiaries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (CESE), we analyze the impact of a CESE credit shock on the capital buffers needed by the sample banking groups under different forms of ring-fencing. Our simulations show that under stricter forms of ring-fencing, sample banking groups have substantially larger needs for capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level than under less strict (or in the absence of any) ring-fencing.