New trends are emerging regarding earnings management and corporate governance showing similarities and striking differences in the practices of different countries and economies. These new trends currently shape the field of modern corporate governance with crucial issues being looked at in governance law and practices, accounting systems, earnings quality and management, stakeholder involvement, and more. In order to advance these new avenues in corporate governance, research looks at accounting policies firms use in different opportunistic circumstances in order to manage earnings, the corporate governance practices in different countries, firm performance, and other dimensions of companies. The understanding of these topics is beneficial in understanding the current state of different types of firms and their practices in modern times. Comparative Research on Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, and Economic Value is focused on the investigation of key challenges and perspectives of corporate governance and earnings management and outlines possible scenarios of its development. The chapters explore this new avenue of research and cover theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies related to different themes in the global context of earnings management and corporate governance. This book is ideal for economists, businesses, managers, accountants, practitioners, stakeholders, researchers, academicians, and students who are interested in the current issues and advancements in corporate governance and earnings management.

This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?

Boards of directors are coming under increasing scrutiny in terms of their contribution in monitoring and controlling management, particularly in the wake of high-profile corporate frauds and failures, and also their potential to add value to organizational performance through involvement in the strategy process and through building relationships with key investors. Despite the importance of these issues, not only to organizations but also arguably to national competitiveness, the nature of board activity remains largely a black box, clouded by prescriptions, prejudices, and half-truths. This book responds to calls for greater scrutiny of boards of directors with an in-depth examination of directors of UK organizations, drawing on the accounts of directors themselves as to their roles, influence, and the potential and limits to their power. Much work on boards of directors has labelled the board as a rubber stamp for dominant management, and non-executive directors in particular have been variously described as poodles, pet rocks, or parsley on the fish. Such accounts are rooted in assumptions of board activity that are essentially adversarial in nature, and that the solution to the 'problem' of reconciling the interests of managers with those of shareholders is to increase the checks and balances available to the board of directors. The findings of this study show that boards, in many cases, are far more than passive rubber stamps for management and that non-executives are encouraged to act as trusted advisers to the executives and the chief executive, rather than solely monitors of executive activity. Boards are important mechanisms in maintaining the strategic framework of the organization through setting the boundaries of organizational activity. The potential of the board members, in particular the non-executives, to fulfil such a mandate depends on a number of factors, including ability, willingness to engage with the organizational issues, and the degree of knowledge they have relevant to the host firm. Above all, the degree of trust built between members of the board, and between the board and key external constituencies, is at the heart of effective board behaviour.

This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.

Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy.

'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.