How does the ontological turn in anthropology redefine what modern, Western ontology is in practice, and offer the beginnings of a new ontological pluralism? On a planet that is increasingly becoming a single, metaphysically homogeneous world, anthropology remains one of the few disciplines that recognizes that being has been thought with very different concepts and can still be rendered in terms quite different than those placed on it today. Yet despite its critical acuity, even the most philosophically oriented anthropology often remains segregated from philosophical discussions aimed at rethinking such terms. What would come of an anthropology more fully committed to being a source of (post-) philosophical concepts? What would happen to philosophy if it began to think with and through these concepts? How, finally, does comparison condition these two projects ? This book addresses these questions from a variety of perspectives, all of which nonetheless hold in common the view that “philosophy” has been displaced and altered by the modes of thought of other collectives. An international group of authors, including Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Marilyn Strathern, Philippe Descola, and Bruno Latour, explore how the new anthropology/philosophy conjuncture opens new horizons of critique.

Kenneth Dorter’s Can Different Cultures Think the Same Thoughts? is a study of fundamental issues in metaphysics and ethics across major philosophical traditions of the world, including the way in which metaphysics can be a foundation for ethics, as well as the importance of metaphysics on its own terms. Dorter examines such questions through a detailed comparison of selected major thinkers and classic works in three global philosophical traditions, those of India, China, and the West. In each chapter Dorter juxtaposes and compares two or more philosophers or classic works from different traditions, from Spinoza and Shankara, to Confucius and Plato, to Marcus Aurelius and the Bhagavad Gita. In doing so he explores different perspectives and reveals limitations and assumptions that might otherwise be obscure. The goal of Dorter’s cross-cultural approach is to consider how far works from different cultures can be understood as holding comparable philosophical views. Although Dorter reveals commonalities across the different traditions, he makes no claim that there is such a thing as a universal philosophy. Clearly there are fundamental disagreements among the philosophers and works studied. Yet in each of the case studies of a particular chapter, we can discover a shared, or at least analogous, way of looking at issues across different cultures. All those interested in metaphysics, ethics, Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and comparative philosophy will find much of interest in this book.

Comparative Philosophy without Borders presents original scholarship by leading contemporary comparative philosophers, each addressing a philosophical issue that transcends the concerns of any one cultural tradition. By critically discussing and weaving together these contributions in terms of their philosophical presuppositions, this cutting-edge volume initiates a more sophisticated, albeit diverse, understanding of doing comparative philosophy. Within a broad conception of the alternative shapes that work in philosophy may take, this volume breaks three kinds of boundaries: between cultures, historical periods and sub-disciplines of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy. As well as distinguishing three phases of the development of comparative philosophy up to the present day, the editors argue why the discipline now needs to enter a new phase. Putting to use philosophical thought and textual sources from Eurasia and Africa, contributors discuss modern psychological and cognitive science approaches to the nature of mind and topics as different as perception, poetry, justice, authority, and the very possibility of understanding other people. Comparative Philosophy without Borders demonstrates how drawing on philosophical resources from across cultural traditions can produce sound state-of-the-art progressive philosophy. Fusing the horizons of traditions opens up a space for creative conceptual thinking outside all sorts of boxes.

After presenting a general survey of spiritual practice in the different schools of Indian philosophy, the author focuses on the Trika School, popularly called Kashmir Shaivism. He deals clearly and exhaustively with such topics as Shaktipat (the descent of Divine Grace), Diksha (initiation), and the role of the Guru. His treatment of the various paths (upayas) appropriate for the different types of practitioners is especially useful. The book ends with a chapter on enlightenment (jivanmukti). This chapter not only presents the meaning of self-realization-in-this-lifetime, but offers material on this topic for the first time in English.

This study of the metaphysics of G. W. Leibniz gives a clear picture of his philosophical development within the general scheme of seventeenth-century natural philosophy. Catherine Wilson examines the shifts in Leibniz's thinking as he confronted the major philosophical problems of his era. Beginning with his interest in artificial languages and calculi for proof and discovery, the author proceeds to an examination of Leibniz’s early theories of matter and motion, to the phenomenalistic turn in his theory of substance and his subsequent de-emphasis of logical determinism, and finally to his doctrines of harmony and optimization. Specific attention is given to Leibniz’s understanding of Descartes and his successors, Malebranche and Spinoza, and the English philosophers Newton, Cudworth, and Locke. Wilson analyzes Leibniz’s complex response to the new mechanical philosophy, his discontent with the foundations on which it rested, and his return to the past to locate the resources for reconstructing it. She argues that the continuum-problem is the key to an understanding not only of Leibniz’s monadology but also of his views on the substantiality of the self and the impossibility of external causal influence. A final chapter considers the problem of Leibniz-reception in the post-Kantian era, and the difficulty of coming to terms with a metaphysics that is not only philosophically "critical" but, at the same time, “compensatory.” Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In this insightful new book David J. Yount argues, against received wisdom, that there are no essential differences between the metaphysics of Plato and Plotinus. Yount covers the core principles of Plotinian thought: The One or Good, Intellect, and All-Soul (the Three Hypostases), Beauty, God(s), Forms, Emanation, Matter, and Evil. After addressing the interpretive issues that surround the authenticity of Plato's works, Plotinus: The Platonist deftly argues against the commonly held view that Plotinus is best interpreted as a Neo-Platonist, proposing he should be thought of as a Platonist proper. Yount presents thorough explanations and quotations from the works of each classical philosopher to demonstrate his thesis, concluding comprehensively that Plato and Plotinus do not essentially differ on their metaphysical conceptions. This is an ideal text for Plato and Plotinus scholars and academics, and excellent supplementary reading for upper-level undergraduates students and postgraduate students of ancient philosophy.

Chinese-Western Comparative Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Topical Approach features a comparative analysis of the fundamental metaphysical assumptions and their epistemological implications in Chinese and Western philosophy. Adopting the methodology of topical comparison that seeks to correlate two or multiple approaches to the same set of questions raised by a single topic or issue, Mingjun Lu argues for commensurability in Chinese and Western metaphysics of both Nature and the mind, and in the epistemology of knowledge dictated by these two fundamental hypotheses of the first principle or primary cause. Lu explores this philosophical commensurability through a comparative analysis of the canonical works written by Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, and Leibniz on the Western side, and by Confucius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, Lu Jiuyuan, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming on the Chinese side. The parallels and analogues revealed by the comparative lens, Lu proposes, bring to light a coherent and well-developed Chinese metaphysical and epistemological system that corresponds closely to that in the West. By inventing such new categories as cosmo-substantial metaphysics, consonant epistemology, natural hermeneutics, and onto-mind reading to reconceptualize Chinese and Western philosophy, Lu suggests alternative and more commensurable grounds of comparison.