In this book, legal scholars, philosophers, historians, and political scientists from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States analyze the common law through three of its classic themes: rules, reasoning, and constitutionalism. Their essays, specially commissioned for this volume, provide an opportunity for thinkers from different jurisdictions and disciplines to talk to each other and to their wider audience within and beyond the common law world. This book allows scholars and students to consider how these themes and concepts relate to one another. It will initiate and sustain a more inclusive and well-informed theoretical discussion of the common law's method, process, and structure. It will be valuable to lawyers, philosophers, political scientists, and historians interested in constitutional law, comparative law, judicial process, legal theory, law and society, legal history, separation of powers, democratic theory, political philosophy, the courts, and the relationship of the common law tradition to other legal systems of the world.

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.

Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.

Calabresi complains that we are "choking on statutes" and proposes a restoration of the courts to their common law function. From a series of lectures given by Calabresi as part of The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures delivered at Harvard Law School in March 1977. "In his most recent publication, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, based on the Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures he delivered at Harvard in March of 1977, Professor Calabresi has brought his ample juristic talents to bear on a foundational problem of the legal and democratic process. He has produced a monograph that in its quality, timeliness and provocativeness is likely to stand alongside the seminal works of Ronald Dworkin and Grant Gilmore." --Allan C. Hutchinson and Derek Morgan, 82 Columbia Law Review (1982) 1752. GUIDO CALABRESI [b. 1932] is Sterling Emeritus Professor of Law and Professorial Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. He was Dean of Yale Law School from 1985-1994 and became a United States Circuit Judge in 1994. He is also the author of The Costs of Accidents (1970), Tragic Choices (1978) and Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law (1985).

Présentation de l'éditeur : "This second edition of a classic in Anglo-American legal philosophy reopens the dialogue between Bentham's work and contemporary legal philosophy. Gerald J. Postema revisits the themes of the first edition in light of the latest scholarly criticism and provides new insights into the historical-philosophical roots of international law"