In the decades before 1914, the City of London was the premier international financial centre. However, this position was not long maintained, other industrial nations quickly and effectively challenged the influence of Britain, and following the disruption of the world markets caused by WorldWar I and the Great Depression of the 1930s, international hegemony slipped away for ever.The relationship of bankers and industrialists has often been cited as a key factor in this decline. Critics of the banks claim that, even before World War I, there were serious deficiencies in the financial provision provided by banks to the domestic industrial sector, and that these deficiencieshandicapped Britain's competitive advantage in world markets, leading to the decline of their influence and power.This book examines these claims, and bringing to bear important new data that presents the debate in a novel and revealing framework, expounds an economic rationale for historical bank behaviour. Using a rich source of contemporary records, it presents a series of micro-economic studies intocommercial bank assets and liabilities, financial crises, bank mergers, the professionalization of banking, the organization and conduct of the industrial loan business, and the nature of bank support given to industrial clients.The result is a new, authoritative interpretation of bank-industry relations in the half-century before World War I.

Traces the effects and consequences of radical economic change, moral, social, and fiscal, in the Victorian period.

This collection of fresh, incisive scholarship, by some of the leading business historians, critically examines the nature of economic recovery in Britain in recent years. Covering the key issues for business history in this period, the book confronts the traditional literature on conclusions of relative decline, and monocausal, simplistic explanations. It provides an impressive range of studies forming a platform for a new debate on the nature of British business in the 20th century. Themes include productivity, management, research and development, marketing, regional clusters and networks, industrial policy, the use of technology, and gender. Sector studies include newer, post-war hopefuls and successes including: * aerospace, * IT, * retail, * banking, * overseas investment, * the creative industries. The book demonstrates that our understanding of the historic strengths and weaknesses of business in Britain, and the shifting balance between sectors of the economy, has until now been poorly understood, and that British business history needs a fundamental reappraisal.

This book focuses on a variety of themes concerning the relationship between financial systems in a broader sense and firms’ growth in historical perspective in some European countries. Financial systems are nowadays largely acknowledged to be a crucial element in determining economic growth. In modern economies, they play a key role by mobilizing savings, pricing risks and allocating capital to firms. Following a consolidated taxonomy focusing on the historical perspective, countries have been conventionally divided into bank-oriented (Continental Europe countries and Japan) and market-oriented systems (Anglo-Saxon countries). The chapters in this book present case studies on Belgium, Great Britain, France and Italy and show that financial systems do not trigger growth processes and industrialization, but they are essential to sustain them over time. Each society has the financial system that fits with its historical trajectory, without any being better or worse than others. The important thing is to have a financial system that is sophisticated and stable, and that evolves according to the demand forces of the moment. History matters. Bank-Industry versus Stock Market-Industry Relationships will be a beneficial read for students interested in economics and business history. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Business History.

Martin Daunton provides a clear and balanced view of the continuities and changes that occurred in the economic history of Britain from the Great Exhibition of 1851 to the Festival of Britain in 1951.In 1851, Britain was the dominant economic power in an increasingly global economy. The First World War marked a turning point, as globalization went into reverse and Britain shifted to 'insular capitalism'.Rather than emphasising the decline of the British economy, this book stresses modernity and the growth of new patterns of consumption in areas such as the service sector and the leisure industry.

This book examines the origins of modern corporate finance systems during the rapid industrialization period leading up to World War I; leading to three sets of conclusions. First, modern financial systems are rooted in the past, are idiosyncratic to specific countries and are highly path-dependent. Therefore, to understand current financial institutions, we must take stock of the forces at play in the near and distant past. Second, financial institutions and markets do not create economic growth without significant first steps in industrial development and supporting institutions. Third, and most important from the modern policy standpoint, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' solution to financial system design and industrial development. Having specific types of financial institutions is far less important than developing a strong, stable and legally protected financial system with a rich diversity of institutions and vibrant markets that can adapt to changing needs.

One striking weaknesses of our financial architecture, which helped bring on and perhaps deepen the Panic of 2008, is an inadequate appreciation of the past. Information about how the system functioned and the reliability of organizations and institutional controls were drawn from a relatively narrow group of recent examples. History and Financial Crisis: Lessons from the 20th Century is an attempt to broaden the range of historical sources used by policy makers to understand and treat financial crises. Many recent discussions of the 2008 panic and the economic turmoil have found the situation to either be unprecedented or greatly similar to that of 1931. However, the book's wide range of contributors suggest that the economic crisis of 2008 cannot be categorised in this way. This book was originally published as a special issue of Business History.