The publication of this compendium could not be more timely as a contribution to the debate which continues in NATO capitals. NATO is an alliance based on consensus. It is also the most effective military alliance in history; this is largely due to the existence of its integrated and multinational command structure. That command structure, the cement of the Alliance as it were, derives from the mutual obligations contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. This contractual obligation, which does not exist for the other missions which have arisen since 1990, means that the defence of NATO territory must be the basis of any restructuring. If we were to move away from this and thus weaken the command structure, even with the best intentions, then it is my firm conviction that we would do serious harm to the Alliance and its future. On the other hand, a modified command structure, still based on the Article V contractual obligation, provides a firm basis, as well as flexibility, versatility, and availability for any non- contractual, namely out-of-area, requirement. Command structures do not exist of their own accord. They come into being, change, and develop, to permit commanders at the appropriate level, from top to bottom, to orchestrate the application of military force at sea, in the air, and on land. There is, however, a limit to which one can impose responsibilities on commanders, who after all are personally responsible for the conduct of operations, and a limit to the amount of specialisation and detail with which they can cope. This is why we have hierarchical command structures with each commander dealing with the appropriate level of competence. It is why at certain levels command should be joint and at others purely functional. How many levels of command are needed will be dictated by the operations factors of time, forces, and space.

That the end of the Cold War has resulted in a massive sea change in Europe's security environment is a fact. Notwithstanding the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appears to be as politically active and institutionally viable, if not more so, than it was before autumn 1989. Since 1990, the NATO Alliance has undertaken major reform initiatives that prepared it for the emerging European security landscape. For instance, at the London Summit of July 1990, the Alliance declared an end of the Cold War. At the Rome Summit (November 1991), NATO released the "Alliance's New Strategic Concept" to be implemented by the Alliance. More recently, at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, the heads of government and state announced, inter alia, the creation of the Partnership for Peace program and approved the concept for the subsequent creation of Alliance Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). Hence, contrary to the views of some critics, the Alliance has clearly demonstrated its intent to reform itself to meet the challenges of the new European security system.

It gives me great, and poignant, pleasure to be asked to write the forward to this compendium on Command in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Cold War. I say poignant because over the last five years, in both national and NATO appointments, I have been closely involved in the reorganisation of NATO's command structures. That process is still not complete. Hence the publication of this compendium could not be more timely as a contribution to the debate which continues in NATO capitals. I will begin by endorsing Dr. Thomas Young's conclusions in his introduction. I do not, however, wish to enter the debate on the approaches of various nations to changes to the command structure: NATO is an alliance based on consensus, and we must accept that. It is also the most effective military alliance in history; this is largely due to the existence of its integrated and multi-national command structure. That command structure, the cement of the Alliance as it were, derives from the mutual obligations contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. This contractual obligation, which does not exist for the other missions which have arisen since 1990, means that the defence of NATO territory must be the basis of any restructuring. If we were to move away from this and thus weaken the command structure, even with the best intentions, then it is my final conviction that we would do serious harm to the Alliance and its future. On the other hand, a modified command structure, still based on the Article V contractual obligation, provides a firm basis, as well as flexibility, versatility, and availability for any non-contractual, namely out-of-area, requirement. Command structures do not exist of their own accord. They come into being, change, and develop, to permit commanders at the appropriate level, from top to bottom, to orchestrate the application of military force at sea, in the air, and on land. There is, however, a limit to which one can impose responsibilities on commanders, who after all are personally responsible for the conduct of operations, and a limit to the amount of specialisation and detail with which they can cope. This is why we have hierarchical command structures with each commander dealing with the appropriate level of competence. It is why at certain levels command should be joint and at others purely functional. How many levels of command are needed will be dictated by the operations factors of time, forces, ix and space. One must be flexible, and on this basis I fundamentally disagree with categorical statements such as those made by Colonel Clemmesen in Chapter 10; for example, "All headquarters with a wartime mission at the operational level must be combined and joint." Equally, I must ask why establishing or keeping "functional" NATO Headquarters at the operational level of command can no longer be justified when such a structure has been adopted for the Implementation Force (IFOR) deployment (as it was in the Gulf War). A further point is that one cannot simply create command structures which work, especially multinational ones, from scratch. NATO therefore needs, in the absence of any specific threat or contingency, to retain the capability to conduct operations which ensure three cascading levels in the spectrum of operational command: 1. Strategic/Operational; 2. Joint Operational; 3. Service-specific Operational. These three levels of command have nothing to do with the existing structure of Major NATO Commander (MNC), Major Subordinate Commander (MSC), and Principal Subordinate Commander (PSC), although these three levels do in fact meet these requirements. It is the principle which counts, not the current number or size of headquarters at each level. All three levels of command may not be needed for every operation, but history tells us that without such capabilities in place and functioning, disaster will beckon.

That the end of the Cold War has resulted in a massive sea change in Europe's security environment is a fact. Notwithstanding the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appears to be as politically active and institutionally viable, if not more so, than it was before autumn 1989. Since 1990, the NATO Alliance has undertaken major reform initiatives that prepared it for the emerging European security landscape. For instance, at the London Summit of July 1990, the Alliance declared an end of the Cold War. At the Rome Summit (November 1991), NATO released the "Alliance's New Strategic Concept" to be implemented by the Alliance. More recently, at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, the heads of government and state announced, inter alia, the creation of the Partnership for Peace program and approved the concept for the subsequent creation of Alliance Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). Hence, contrary to the views of some critics, the Alliance has clearly demonstrated its intent to reform itself to meet the challenges of the new European security system.

This book offers a biography of the most glamorous and powerful NATO Supreme Commander of the Cold War, General Lauris Norstad, as both a "nuclear" general and an "international" general. His primary goal was to keep the Alliance together as he accommodated British and French nuclear ambitions while forestalling the same in West Germany. He also was at the center of the political/military maneuverings over Berlin and the Soviet attempt to blackmail the West into recognizing East Germany, all of which culminated in the building of the infamous "Wall."

For more than forty years NATO premised its defence on credible nuclear deterrence. Underwriting this deterrence was NATO's strategy and the nuclear weapons and command and control systems intended to make the strategy an operational reality. This book examines NATO's attempts between 1952 and 1990 to achieve the political and military control of nuclear weapons operations in a multinational organisation. By using case-studies of US, British, French and NATO nuclear weapons operations and empirical evidence from Cold War crises it provides an analysis of NATO's experience and offers insights for the present day.