This book sheds new light on the role played by European banks in the economic colonization of much of the globe. Based on previously unused archival material, it examines the origins and development of imperial banking systems. Contributors utilize new developments and methodology in business history to explore a broad range of countries including Cuba, Brazil, Portugal, South Africa and Algeria. The central topic of interest in this book is the institutional history of central, issuing and rediscounting banks. While much attention has been paid to the British, Dutch and French banks and financial instituions, this book is unique in its focus on colonial and overseas banking. Using a range of case studies, this book highlights both the immense variety and cohesion that defined colonial banking practices. This book will be of interest to researchers concerned with international finance and banking and economic history.

This volume examines various banking systems from around the world as well as the mechanisms of international and central banking. Although inevitably a reflection of the banking landscape at the time it was originally published, the book nonetheless represents a valuable tool in providing information on the history of banks and the banking sector which laid the foundations of the system we know today.

This volume examines various banking systems from around the world as well as the mechanisms of international and central banking. Although inevitably a reflection of the banking landscape at the time it was originally published, the book nonetheless represents a valuable tool in providing information on the history of banks and the banking sector which laid the foundations of the system we know today.

This paper introduces a comprehensive database on bank ownership for 137 countries over 1995-2009, and reviews foreign bank behavior and impact. It documents substantial increases in foreign bank presence, with many more home and host countries. Current market shares of foreign banks average 20 percent in OECD countries and 50 percent elsewhere. Foreign banks have higher capital and more liquidity, but lower profitability than domestic banks do. Only in developing countries is foreign bank presence negatively related with domestic credit creation. During the global crisis foreign banks reduced credit more compared to domestic banks, except when they dominated the host banking systems.

From the end of the nineteenth century until the onset of the Great Depression, Wall Street embarked on a stunning, unprecedented, and often bloody period of international expansion in the Caribbean. A host of financial entities sought to control banking, trade, and finance in the region. In the process, they not only trampled local sovereignty, grappled with domestic banking regulation, and backed US imperialism—but they also set the model for bad behavior by banks, visible still today. In Bankers and Empire, Peter James Hudson tells the provocative story of this period, taking a close look at both the institutions and individuals who defined this era of American capitalism in the West Indies. Whether in Wall Street minstrel shows or in dubious practices across the Caribbean, the behavior of the banks was deeply conditioned by bankers’ racial views and prejudices. Drawing deeply on a broad range of sources, Hudson reveals that the banks’ experimental practices and projects in the Caribbean often led to embarrassing failure, and, eventually, literal erasure from the archives.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.