This volume collects thirteen papers by one of the leading philosophers of his generation, who died prematurely in 1980. The majority deal with the philosophy of language, informed by a lively sense of the interconnections with issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind.

The idea of this anthology is to explore the relationships between phenomenology and the social sciences.

Following the thematic divisions of the first three volumes of Alfred Schutz's Collected Papers into The Problem of Social Reality, Studies in Social Theory and Phenomenological Philosophy, this fourth volume contains drafts of unfinished writings, drafts of published writings, translations of essays previously published in German, and some largely unpublished correspondence. The drafts of published writings contain important material omitted from the published versions, and the unfinished writings offer important insights into Schutz's otherwise unpublished ideas about economic and political theory as well as the theory of law and the state. In addition, a large group contains Schutz's reflections on problems in phenomenological philosophy, including music, which both supplement and add new dimensions to his published thought. All together, the writings in this volume cover Schutz's last 15 years in Europe as well as manuscripts written after his arrival in the USA in 1939. Audience: Students and scholars of phenomenology, social theory and the human sciences in general.

Der vorliegende Band der "Gesammelten Aufsatze" tragt den Titel "Studien zur Phanomenologischen Philosophie." In ihm sind Alfred Schutz' Interpretationen phanomenologischer Haupt them en enthalten. An dieser Stelle soIl nun nicht die Interpreta tion noch einmal ausgelegt werden. Vielmehr wollen wir fragen, we1che Stellung der Autor in der sogenannten "Phanomenolo gischen Bewegung" einnimmt. Schutz selbst bestimmt in einer personlichen Tonbandaufzeich nung! seinen Standort in der Phanomenologie und seine Herkunft aus den philosophischen Schulen der Studienzeit. "Ich traf den groBen Denker zum erstenmal 1932, als er schon lange keine Vorlesungen mehr hielt, zwolf Jahre nach dem Ende meines Studiums an der Universitat Wien. Mein Weg zur Philo sophie Husserls war, wie er selbst einmal sagte, hochst ungewohn lich. Seit meinen fruhesten Studientagen galt mein Interesse am meisten der philosophischen Grundlegung der Sozialwissenschaf ten, besonders der Soziologie. Zu jener Zeit stand ich noch ganz im Banne Max Webers, insbesondere war ich von seinen methodo logischen Schriften fasziniert. Ich erkannte jedoch bald, daB Max Weber die Werkzeuge, we1che er fur seine konkrete Forschung benotigte, zwar geschmiedet hatte, daB aber sein Hauptproblem - das Verstehen des subjektiven Sinnes einer sozialen Handlung fur den Handelnden selbst - noch der philosophischen Begriin dung bedurfe. Mein Lehrer der Rechtsphilosophie, Hans Kelsen, hatte den Versuch unternommen, eine so1che philosophische 1 Tonbandaufzeichnung.

Elsewhere 1 we were concerned with fundamental aspects of the question how man can comprehend his fellow-men. We analyzed man's subjective experiences of the Other and found in them the basis for his understanding of the Other's subjective processes of consciousness. The very assumption of the existence of the Other, however, introduces the dimension of intersub jectivity. The world is experienced by the Self as being inhabited by other Selves, as being a world for others and of others. As we had occasion to point out, intersubjective reality is by no means homogeneous. The social world in which man finds himself exhibits a complex structure; fellow-men appear to the Self under different aspects, to which correspond different cognitive styles by which the Self perceives and apprehends the Other's thoughts, motives, and actions. In the present investigation it will be our main task to describe the origin of the differentiated structures of social reality as well as to reveal the principles underlying its unity and coherence. It must be stressed that careful description of the processes which enable one man to understand another's thoughts and actions is a prerequisite for the methodology of the empirical social sciences. The question how a scientific interpretation of human action is possible can be resolved only if an adequate • From: De, sinnha/te A II/ball tler sowuen WeU, Vienna, 1932; 2nd ed. 1960 (Sektion IV: Strukturanalyse der Sozialwelt, Soziale Umwelt, Mitwelt, Vorwelt, English adaptation by Professor Thomas Luckmann.

This book shows how phenomenology of the social sciences differs from positivistic approaches, and presents Schutz's theory of relevances--a key feature of his own phenomenology of the social world. It begins with Schutz's appraisal of how Husserl influenced him, and continues with exchanges between Schutz and Eric Voegelin, Felix Kaufmann, Aron Gurwitsch, and Talcott Parsons. This book presents, for the first time, Schutz's incisive criticisms of T.S. Eliot's theory of culture.