This report was prepared as an independent assessment of the coastal physical processes occurring along Brevard County, Florida. The study was conducted for the U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, in its involvement with the lawsuit Applegate et al. versus the United States of America. Long-term regional beach change is evaluated by analysis of survey data on shoreline position, bathymetry, and beach profiles taken through time. In addition, analysis is specifically made for the properties of two test plaintiffs selected by the Court. Estimates of beach and dune erosion, if any, are calculated for the two test plaintiffs from date of purchase of the properties. Erosion of the beaches and dunes, principally attributed to storms, was estimated at the properties of the two test plaintiffs by compiling storm data and calculating beach and dune change with a numerical model.

This report was prepared as an independent assessment of the coastal physical processes occurring along Brevard County, Florida. The study was conducted for the U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, in its involvement with the lawsuit Applegate et al. versus the United States of America. Long-term regional beach change is evaluated by analysis of survey data on shoreline position, bathymetry, and beach profiles taken through time. In addition, analysis is specifically made for the properties of two test plaintiffs selected by the Court. Estimates of beach and dune erosion, if any, are calculated for the two test plaintiffs from date of purchase of the properties. Erosion of the beaches and dunes, principally attributed to storms, was estimated at the properties of the two test plaintiffs by compiling storm data and calculating beach and dune change with a numerical model.

This intelligence guide was prepared in response to requests from law enforcement executives for guidance in intelligence functions in a post-September 11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while preserving community policing relationships. The world of law enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have been tasked with a variety of new responsibilities; intelligence is just one. In addition, the intelligence discipline has evolved significantly in recent years. As these various trends have merged, increasing numbers of American law enforcement agencies have begun to explore, and sometimes embrace, the intelligence function. This guide is intended to help them in this process. The guide is directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources. It is a primera place to start on a new managerial journey. Every law enforcement agency in the United States, regardless of agency size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Each agency must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential that law enforcement agencies develop lines of communication and information-sharing protocols with the private sector, particularly those related to the critical infrastructure, as well as with those private entities that are potential targets of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Not every agency has the staff or resources to create a formal intelligence unit, nor is it necessary in smaller agencies. This document will provide common language and processes to develop and employ an intelligence capacity in SLTLE agencies across the United States as well as articulate a uniform understanding of concepts, issues, and terminology for law enforcement intelligence (LEI). While terrorism issues are currently most pervasive in the current discussion of LEI, the principles of intelligence discussed in this document apply beyond terrorism and include organized crime and entrepreneurial crime of all forms. Drug trafficking and the associated crime of money laundering, for example, continue to be a significant challenge for law enforcement. Transnational computer crime, particularly Internet fraud, identity theft cartels, and global black marketeering of stolen and counterfeit goods, are entrepreneurial crime problems that are increasingly being relegated to SLTLE agencies to investigate simply because of the volume of criminal incidents. Similarly, local law enforcement is being increasingly drawn into human trafficking and illegal immigration enterprises and the often associated crimes related to counterfeiting of official documents, such as passports, visas, driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and credit cards. All require an intelligence capacity for SLTLE, as does the continuation of historical organized crime activities such as auto theft, cargo theft, and virtually any other scheme that can produce profit for an organized criminal entity. To be effective, the law enforcement community must interpret intelligence-related language in a consistent manner. In addition, common standards, policies, and practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.~

Prepared by the Institute on Crime, Justice and Corrections at the George Washington University and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

Across the United States, thousands of hazardous waste sites are contaminated with chemicals that prevent the underlying groundwater from meeting drinking water standards. These include Superfund sites and other facilities that handle and dispose of hazardous waste, active and inactive dry cleaners, and leaking underground storage tanks; many are at federal facilities such as military installations. While many sites have been closed over the past 30 years through cleanup programs run by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. EPA, and other state and federal agencies, the remaining caseload is much more difficult to address because the nature of the contamination and subsurface conditions make it difficult to achieve drinking water standards in the affected groundwater. Alternatives for Managing the Nation's Complex Contaminated Groundwater Sites estimates that at least 126,000 sites across the U.S. still have contaminated groundwater, and their closure is expected to cost at least $110 billion to $127 billion. About 10 percent of these sites are considered "complex," meaning restoration is unlikely to be achieved in the next 50 to 100 years due to technological limitations. At sites where contaminant concentrations have plateaued at levels above cleanup goals despite active efforts, the report recommends evaluating whether the sites should transition to long-term management, where risks would be monitored and harmful exposures prevented, but at reduced costs.