Climate change can reasonably be expected to increase the frequency and intensity of a variety of potentially disruptive environmental events-slowly at first, but then more quickly. It is prudent to expect to be surprised by the way in which these events may cascade, or have far-reaching effects. During the coming decade, certain climate-related events will produce consequences that exceed the capacity of the affected societies or global systems to manage; these may have global security implications. Although focused on events outside the United States, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis recommends a range of research and policy actions to create a whole-of-government approach to increasing understanding of complex and contingent connections between climate and security, and to inform choices about adapting to and reducing vulnerability to climate change.

In recent years, with the accumulation of scientific evidence indicating that the global climate is moving outside the bounds of past experience and can be expected to put new stresses on societies around the world, the U.S. intelligence and security communities have begun to examine a variety of plausible scenarios through which climate change might pose or alter security risks. As this study developed we focused our efforts in three specific ways. First, we focused on social and political stresses outside the United States because such stresses are the main focus of the intelligence community. Second, we concentrated on security risks that might arise from situations in which climate events (e.g., droughts, heat waves, or storms) have consequences that exceed the capacity of affected countries or populations to cope and respond. This focus led us to exclude, for example, climate events that might directly affect the ability of the U.S. military to conduct its missions or that might contribute directly to international competition or conflict (e.g., over sea lanes or natural resources in the Arctic). We also excluded the security implications of policies that countries might undertake to protect themselves from perceived threats of climate change (e.g., geoengineering to reduce global warming or buying foreign agricultural land to ensure domestic food supplies). These kinds of climate-security connections could prove highly significant and deserve further study and analysis. They could also interact with the connections that are our main focus; for example, an action such as buying foreign agricultural land might go almost unnoticed at first, only creating a crisis when the country where the land is located experiences a crop failure it cannot manage with imports. Third, we concentrated on the relatively near term by emphasizing climate-driven security risks that call for action by the intelligence community within the coming decade either to respond to security threats or to anticipate them. Although these choices of focus helped bound our study, they left it with some notable limitations.

In recent years, with the accumulation of scientific evidence indicating that the global climate is moving outside the bounds of past experience and can be expected to put new stresses on societies around the world, the U.S. intelligence and security communities have begun to examine a variety of plausible scenarios through which climate change might pose or alter security risks. As this study developed we focused our efforts in three specific ways. First, we focused on social and political stresses outside the United States because such stresses are the main focus of the intelligence community. Second, we concentrated on security risks that might arise from situations in which climate events (e.g., droughts, heat waves, or storms) have consequences that exceed the capacity of affected countries or populations to cope and respond. This focus led us to exclude, for example, climate events that might directly affect the ability of the U.S. military to conduct its missions or that might contribute directly to international competition or conflict (e.g., over sea lanes or natural resources in the Arctic). We also excluded the security implications of policies that countries might undertake to protect themselves from perceived threats of climate change (e.g., geoengineering to reduce global warming or buying foreign agricultural land to ensure domestic food supplies). These kinds of climate-security connections could prove highly significant and deserve further study and analysis. They could also interact with the connections that are our main focus; for example, an action such as buying foreign agricultural land might go almost unnoticed at first, only creating a crisis when the country where the land is located experiences a crop failure it cannot manage with imports. Third, we concentrated on the relatively near term by emphasizing climate-driven security risks that call for action by the intelligence community within the coming decade either to respond to security threats or to anticipate them. Although these choices of focus helped bound our study, they left it with some notable limitations.

The mastery of a variety of biomedical They avoided the self-destruction and dis techniques has led our society to the solu ease that can so readily follow the escalation tion of the problems in environmental con of social disorder in an isolated colony. By trol imposed by space flight. By an unparal following a "code of civility" that may be as leled social cooperative effort, man has much a part of man's biologic inheritance as launched himself successfully on the path of his speech, they established cultures in interplanetary exploration and space travel. which power was exercised with sufficient By a like synthesis of knowledge available to respect to establish a consensus. They fol him, Stone Age man kept a foothold on tiny lowed revered cultural canons, using an Pacific atolls for the better part of a thousand accumulation of rational empiric data from years, despite obliterating hurricanes and social experience to modify and control the inherited biogrammar. This we often fail to limited resources. By combining empiric do. There is growing evidence that it is phys navigational skills, such as the sighting of stars with intuitive feeling for ocean swells iologically possible for the left hemisphere of and other subtle cues, tiny populations were the brain, which deals with logic and lan maintained in communication over vast dis guage, to be cut off from the right hemi tances.

The United States is among the wealthiest nations in the world, but it is far from the healthiest. Although life expectancy and survival rates in the United States have improved dramatically over the past century, Americans live shorter lives and experience more injuries and illnesses than people in other high-income countries. The U.S. health disadvantage cannot be attributed solely to the adverse health status of racial or ethnic minorities or poor people: even highly advantaged Americans are in worse health than their counterparts in other, "peer" countries. In light of the new and growing evidence about the U.S. health disadvantage, the National Institutes of Health asked the National Research Council (NRC) and the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene a panel of experts to study the issue. The Panel on Understanding Cross-National Health Differences Among High-Income Countries examined whether the U.S. health disadvantage exists across the life span, considered potential explanations, and assessed the larger implications of the findings. U.S. Health in International Perspective presents detailed evidence on the issue, explores the possible explanations for the shorter and less healthy lives of Americans than those of people in comparable countries, and recommends actions by both government and nongovernment agencies and organizations to address the U.S. health disadvantage.

La jacquette indique : Climate change has emerged a central and undeniable issue for nations as its effects are causing environmental damage that triggers enormous human insecurity and conflict around the world. South Asia in particular has been identified as one of the more high risk regions of the world when it comes to climate change and its impacts. Though some scholars and policy makers contend there is no concrete evidence of a correlation between climate change and conflict, we compile compelling stories that connect climate change effects with human insecurity and conflict in South Asia. Using five years of research, looking at media and scientific reports from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, we document ample evidence that climate stress has become a powerful catalyst for social tension and insecurity. Erratic climate events (e.g., 2010 floods in Pakistan and 2012 flood in North India and Nepal) as a result of climate variability have impacted millions of livelihoods throughout South Asia and rendered billions of dollars in damage on homes and national infrastructure. This book documents that when climate stress causes insecurity among people, the situations can be manipulated for political ends, and often results in social conflict. Hence, it is important for South Asian nations to work together in the framework of environmental security to tackle the challenges arising from the climate stress. In this context, this book provides a framework of analysis of environmental security to deal with the causes and consequences of climate change.

Psychology and Climate Change: Human Perceptions, Impacts, and Responses organizes and summarizes recent psychological research that relates to the issue of climate change. The book covers topics such as how people perceive and respond to climate change, how people understand and communicate about the issue, how it impacts individuals and communities, particularly vulnerable communities, and how individuals and communities can best prepare for and mitigate negative climate change impacts. It addresses the topic at multiple scales, from individuals to close social networks and communities. Further, it considers the role of social diversity in shaping vulnerability and reactions to climate change. Psychology and Climate Change describes the implications of psychological processes such as perceptions and motivations (e.g., risk perception, motivated cognition, denial), emotional responses, group identities, mental health and well-being, sense of place, and behavior (mitigation and adaptation). The book strives to engage diverse stakeholders, from multiple disciplines in addition to psychology, and at every level of decision making - individual, community, national, and international, to understand the ways in which human capabilities and tendencies can and should shape policy and action to address the urgent and very real issue of climate change. Examines the role of knowledge, norms, experience, and social context in climate change awareness and action Considers the role of identity threat, identity-based motivation, and belonging Presents a conceptual framework for classifying individual and household behavior Develops a model to explain environmentally sustainable behavior Draws on what we know about participation in collective action Describes ways to improve the effectiveness of climate change communication efforts Discusses the difference between acute climate change events and slowly-emerging changes on our mental health Addresses psychological stress and injury related to global climate change from an intersectional justice perspective Promotes individual and community resilience