Over the centuries an intriguing collection of thinkers have realized that voting and social choice are not straightforward. Yet despite the work of many distinguished contributors in this area, the subject has only become established in the last few decades. Indeed, many earlier writings were lost and their content forgotten, only to be rediscovered later and then forgotten again. This puzzling saga of intellectual history unfolds in Classics of Social Choice through these original writings. The editors have included recently discovered pieces and other major contributions - newly translated where necessary. The introduction explains who each writer was, locates him in a historical context, and analyzes his argument. It was only in the 1940s and 1950s that the theory of social choice was established by Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow - whose Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded in part for this work. It is now a large and thriving branch of economics and politics. Classics of Social Choice will interest anyone working in social choice theory as well as students of medieval thought, the Enlightenment, and constitutions.

Over the centuries an intriguing collection of thinkers have realized that voting and social choice are not straightforward. Yet despite the work of many distinguished contributors in this area, the subject has only become established in the last few decades. Indeed, many earlier writings were lost and their content forgotten, only to be rediscovered later and then forgotten again. This puzzling saga of intellectual history unfolds in Classics of Social Choice through these original writings. The editors have included recently discovered pieces and other major contributions - newly translated where necessary. The introduction explains who each writer was, locates him in a historical context, and analyzes his argument. It was only in the 1940s and 1950s that the theory of social choice was established by Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow - whose Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded in part for this work. It is now a large and thriving branch of economics and politics. Classics of Social Choice will interest anyone working in social choice theory as well as students of medieval thought, the Enlightenment, and constitutions.

Originally published in 1970, this classic study has been recognized for its groundbreaking role in integrating economics and ethics, and for its influence in opening up new areas of research in social choice, including aggregative assessment. It has also had a large influence on international organizations, including the United Nations, notably in its work on human development. The book showed that the “impossibility theorems” in social choice theory—led by the pioneering work of Kenneth Arrow—do not negate the possibility of reasoned and democratic social choice. Sen’s ideas about social choice, welfare economics, inequality, poverty, and human rights have continued to evolve since the book’s first appearance. This expanded edition preserves the text of the original while presenting eleven new chapters of fresh arguments and results. “Expanding on the early work of Condorcet, Pareto, Arrow, and others, Sen provides rigorous mathematical argumentation on the merits of voting mechanisms...For those with graduate training, it will serve as a frequently consulted reference and a necessity on one’s book shelf.” —J. F. O’Connell, Choice

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods. - Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory - Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation - Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making - Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes

This book is an introduction to the logic and analytics of group choice. To understand how political institutions work, it is important to isolate what citizens - as individuals and as members of society - actually want. This book develops a means of 'representing' the preferences of citizens so that institutions can be studied more carefully. This is the first book to integrate the classical problem of constitutions with modern spatial theory, connecting Aristotle and Montesquieu with Arrow and Buchanan.

The mathematical theory of democracy deals with selection of representatives who make decisions on behalf of the whole society. In this book, the notion of representativeness is operationalized with the index of popularity (the average percentage of the population whose opinion is represented on a number of issues) and the index of universality (the frequency of cases when the opinion of a majority is represented). These indices are applied to evaluate and study the properties of single representatives (e.g. president) and representative bodies (e.g. parliament, magistrate, cabinet, jury, coalition). To bridge representative and direct democracy, an election method is proposed that is based not on voting but on indexing candidates with respect to the electorate’s political profile. In addition, societal and non-societal applications are considered.