Induction is a basic method of scientific and philosophical inquiry. The work seeks to show against the skeptical tide that the method is secure and reliable. The problem of induction has been a hotly debated issue in modern and contemporary philosophy since David Hume. However, long before the modern era Indian philosophers have addressed this problem for about two thousand years. This work examines some major Indian viewpoints including those of Jayarasi (7th century), Dharmakirti (7th century), Prabhakara (8th century), Udayana (11th century) and Prabhacandra (14th century). It also discusses some influential contemporary positions including those of Russell, Strawson, Popper, Reichenbach, Carnap, Goodman and Quine. The main focus is on the Nyaya view developed by Gangesa (13th century). A substantial part of the work is devoted to annotated translation of selected chapters from Gangesa's work dealing with the problem of induction with copious references to the later Nyaya philosophers including Raghunatha (15th century), Mathuranatha (16th century), Jagadisa (17th century) and Gadadhara (17th century). An annotated translation of selections from Sriharsa (12th century) of the Vedanta school, Prabhacandra of the Jaina school and Dharmakirti of the Buddhist school is also included. A solution is presented to the classical problem of induction and the Grue paradox based on the Nyaya perspective. The solution includes an argument from counterfactual reasoning, arguments in defense of causality, analyses of circularity and logical economy, arguments for objective universals and an argument from belief-behavior contradiction.

Addresses the psycho-physical dualism of the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy with references to both Indian and Western philosophy.

This book examines psycho-physical dualism as developed by the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy. Dualism is important to many world religions which promote personal immortality and to morality which promotes free will. For the Nyāya, the self is a permanent, immaterial substance to which non-physical internal states like cognition belong. This view is challenged by other Indian schools, especially the Buddhist and Cārvāka schools. Chakrabarti brings out the connections between the Indian and the Western debates over the mind-body problem and shows that the Nyāya position is well developed, well articulated, and defensible. He shows that Nyāya dualism differs from Cartesian dualism and is not vulnerable to some traditional objections against the latter. A brief discussion of the Sāṃkhya and the Advaita theories of the self and the critique of these views from the Nyāya standpoint are included, as well as a discussion of a classical Nyāya causal argument for the existence of God. The appendix contains an annotated translation of selected portions of Udayana's masterpiece, Ātmatattvaviveka (Discerning the Nature of the Self.)

In this comprehensive textbook, renowned philosopher J. N. Mohanty examines the range of Indian philosophy from the Sutra period through the 17th century Navya Nyaya. Classical Indian Philosophy is divided into three parts that cover epistemology, metaphysics, and the attempt to transcend the distinction between subject and object. Instead of concentrating on the different systems, Mohanty focuses on the major concepts and problems dealt with in Indian philosophy. The book includes discussions of Indian ethics and social philosophy, as well as of Indian law and aesthetics. Classical Indian Philosophy is essential reading for students of Indian philosophy at every level.

Beginning with the earliest strata of Indian philosophy, this book uncovers a distinct tradition of skepticism in Indian philosophy through a study of the “three pillars” of Indian skepticism near the beginning, middle, and end of the classical era: Nāgārjuna (c. 150-200 CE), Jayarāśi (c. 770-830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa (c. 1125-1180 CE). Moving beyond the traditional school model of understanding the history of Indian philosophy, this book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures coming from different schools but utilizing similar methods: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. This book argues that there is a category of skepticism often overlooked by philosophers today: skepticism about philosophy, varieties of which are found not only in classical India but also in the Western tradition in Pyrrhonian skepticism. Skepticism about philosophy consists of intellectual therapies for those afflicted by the quest for dogmatic beliefs. The book begins with the roots of this type of skepticism in ancient India in the Ṛg Veda, Upaniṣads, and early Buddhist texts. Then there are two chapters on each of the three major figures: one chapter giving each philosopher’s overall aims and methods and a second demonstrating how each philosopher applies these methods to specific philosophical issues. The conclusion shows how the history of Indian skepticism might help to answer philosophy’s detractors today: while skeptics demonstrate that we should be modest about philosophy’s ability to produce firm answers, philosophy nonetheless has other uses such as cultivating critical thinking skills and lessening dogmatism. This book is situated within a larger project of expanding the history of philosophy. Just as the history of Western philosophy ought to inform contemporary philosophy, so should expanding the history of philosophy to include classical India illuminate understandings of philosophy today: its value, limits, and what it can do for us in the 21st century.

This original work focuses on the rational principles of Indian philosophical theory, rather than the mysticism more usually associated with it. Ganeri explores the philosophical projects of a number of major Indian philosophers and looks into the methods of rational inquiry deployed within these projects. In so doing, he illuminates a network of mutual reference, criticism, influence and response, in which reason is used to call itself into question. This fresh perspective on classical Indian thought unravels new philosophical paradigms, and points towards new applications for the concept of reason.

Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri present a lively introduction to one of the world's richest intellectual traditions: the philosophy of classical India. They begin with the earliest extant literature, the Vedas, and the explanatory works that these inspired, known as Upaniṣads. They also discuss other famous texts of classical Vedic culture, especially the Mahābhārata and its most notable section, the Bhagavad-Gīta, alongside the rise of Buddhism and Jainism. In this opening section, Adamson and Ganeri emphasize the way that philosophy was practiced as a form of life in search of liberation from suffering. Next, the pair move on to the explosion of philosophical speculation devoted to foundational texts called 'sutras,' discussing such traditions as the logical and epistemological Nyāya school, the monism of Advaita Vedānta, and the spiritual discipline of Yoga. In the final section of the book, they chart further developments within Buddhism, highlighting Nagārjuna's radical critique of 'non-dependent' concepts and the no-self philosophy of mind found in authors like Dignāga, and within Jainism, focusing especially on its 'standpoint' epistemology. Unlike other introductions that cover the main schools and positions in classical Indian philosophy, Adamson and Ganeri's lively guide also pays attention to philosophical themes such as non-violence, political authority, and the status of women, while considering textual traditions typically left out of overviews of Indian thought, like the Cārvaka school, Tantra, and aesthetic theory as well. Adamson and Ganeri conclude by focusing on the much-debated question of whether Indian philosophy may have influenced ancient Greek philosophy and, from there, evaluate the impact that this area of philosophy had on later Western thought.