Since the end of the Cold War, a series of costly civil wars, many of them ethnic conflicts, have dominated the international security agenda. This volume offers a detailed examination of four recent interventions by the international community.

Since the end of the Cold War, a series of costly civil wars, many of them ethnic conflicts, have dominated the international security agenda. This volume offers a detailed examination of four recent interventions by the international community.

The 2013 debate over whether the United States should intervene in the Syrian conflict raised important questions regarding the benefits countries receive when they intervene in civil wars, and how those benefits are distributed to the citizens of the intervening country. To address these lingering questions this book offers readers a comprehensive examination of the intervention process, examining the decision to intervene, what motivates states, and how their intervention shapes the conflict process. Most, importantly, the book examines how states benefit from their interventions and the distribution of intervenor benefits. Specially two questions are addressed: What are the benefits of intervention for intervening countries? And, how are benefits distributed within the intervenors society? Using evidence compiled from three case studies (El Salvador, The Philippines, and Sri Lanka), this book examines what motivated states to intervene, how they intervened, what they got from their intervention, and how the benefits of the intervention were distributed among the public. Arguing that foreign policy and security decision making is isolated from the general public, this book argues that citizens gain little from indirect interventions into civil wars.

"This book identifies the conditions under which foreign countries intervene in civil wars, contending that we should consider four dimensions of civil war intervention. The first dimension is the civil war itself. The characteristics of the civil war itself are important determinants of a third party's decision making regarding intervention. The second dimension is the characteristics of intervening states, and includes their capabilities and domestic political environments. The third is the relationship between the host country and the intervening country. These states' formal alliances and the differences in military capability between the target country and the potential intervener have an impact on the decision making process. The fourth dimension is the relationship between the interveners. This framework of four dimensions proves critical in understanding foreign intervention in civil wars. Based on this framework, the model for the intervention mechanism can reflect reality better. By including the relationships between the interveners here, the book shows that it is important to distinguish between intervention on the side of the government and intervention on behalf of the opposition. Without distinguishing between these, it is impossible to consider the concepts of counter-intervention and bandwagoning intervention."

Explores how outside intervention affects the course of civil wars

Why do some civil wars end in successfully implemented peace settlements while others are fought to the finish? Numerous competing theories address this question. Yet not until now has a study combined the historical sweep, empirical richness, and conceptual rigor necessary to put them thoroughly to the test and draw lessons invaluable to students, scholars, and policymakers. Using data on every civil war fought between 1940 and 1992, Barbara Walter details the conditions that lead combatants to partake in what she defines as a three-step process--the decision on whether to initiate negotiations, to compromise, and, finally, to implement any resulting terms. Her key finding: rarely are such conflicts resolved without active third-party intervention. Walter argues that for negotiations to succeed it is not enough for the opposing sides to resolve the underlying issues behind a civil war. Instead the combatants must clear the much higher hurdle of designing credible guarantees on the terms of agreement--something that is difficult without outside assistance. Examining conflicts from Greece to Laos, China to Columbia, Bosnia to Rwanda, Walter confirms just how crucial the prospect of third-party security guarantees and effective power-sharing pacts can be--and that adversaries do, in fact, consider such factors in deciding whether to negotiate or fight. While taking many other variables into account and acknowledging that third parties must also weigh the costs and benefits of involvement in civil war resolution, this study reveals not only how peace is possible, but probable.