EARL J. HESS is Stewart W. McClelland Chair in History at Lincoln Memorial University and the author of fifteen books on the Civil War, including Kennesaw Mountain: Sherman, Johnston, and the Atlanta Campaign ; The Knoxville Campaign: Burnside and Longstreet in East Tennessee ; and The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi.

Analyzes the events, weapons, and strategies of the Civil War and argues that the introduction of modern weaponry did not have significant effect on the outcome or the conduct of the war

Challenges the longstanding view that the rifle musket revolutionized warfare during the Civil War, arguing instead that its actual impact was real but limited and specialized.

The American Civil War was the world's first full-blown 'railroad war'. The well-developed network in the North was of great importance in serving the Union armies' logistic needs over long distances, and the sparser resources of the South were proportionately even more important. Both sides invested great efforts in raiding and wrecking enemy railroads and defending and repairing their own, and battles often revolved around strategic rail junctions. Robert Hodges reveals the thrilling chases and pitched battles that made the railroad so dangerous and resulted in a surprisingly high casualty rate. He describes the equipment and tactics used by both sides and the vital supporting elements – maintenance works, telegraph lines, fuel and water supplies, as well as garrisoned blockhouses to protect key points. Full-colour illustrations bring the fast-paced action to life in this fascinating read; a must-have volume for rail and Civil War enthusiasts.

Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.

Why did the Confederacy lose so many men? The authors contend that the Confederates bled themselves nearly to death in the first three years of the war by making costly attacks more often than the Federals. Offensive tactics, which had been used successfully by Americans in the Mexican War, were much less effective in the 1860s because an improved weapon - the rifle - had given increased strength to defenders. This book describes tactical theory in the 1850s and suggests how each related to Civil War tactics. It also considers the development of tactics in all three arms of the service during the Civil War.