This study uses the postmodern military model to measure how public perception of the military is influenced by self-identification in Taiwan. It unveils the schism that exists between military and society, contributing to low morale and a lack of esprit de corps that puts the island’s forces at risk from an increasingly confident China.

Examines civil-military relations in China. Reflects the significant changes taking place in Chinese society and their impact on the civil-military dynamic, with particular attention to how the military will fit in with the new class of entrepreneurs.

This study uses the postmodern military model to measure how public perception of the military is influenced by self-identification in Taiwan. It unveils the schism that exists between military and society, contributing to low morale and a lack of esprit de corps that puts the island’s forces at risk from an increasingly confident China.

In recent decades, several East Asian nations have undergone democratic transitions accompanied by changes in the balance of power between civilian elites and military leaders. These developments have not followed a single pattern: In Thailand, failure to institutionalize civilian control has contributed to the breakdown of democracy; civil-military relations and democracy in the Philippines are in prolonged crisis; and civilian control in Indonesia is yet to be institutionalized. At the same time, South Korea and Taiwan have established civilian supremacy and made great advances in consolidating democracy. These differences can be explained by the interplay of structural environment and civilian political entrepreneurship. In Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia, strategic action, prioritization, and careful timing helped civilians make the best of their structural opportunities to overcome legacies of military involvement in politics. In Thailand, civilians overestimated their ability to control the military and provoked military intervention. In the Philippines, civilian governments forged a symbiotic relationship with military elites that allowed civilians to survive in office but also protected the military's institutional interests. These differences in the development of civil-military relations had serious repercussions on national security, political stability, and democratic consolidation, helping to explain why South Korea, Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, Indonesia have experienced successful democratic transformation, while Thailand and the Philippines have failed to establish stable democratic systems.

This is the first scholarly study of the prewar phase of the French army's development into a disruptive force in national life. A chapter from the portentous 20th-century story of the soldier in politics, it has relevance to contemporary situations in other western societies. The book includes an encyclopedic bibliography.

This is the first explanation and evaluation of Taiwan’s defence forces and infrastructure. It examines not only Taiwan’s armed forces, but also its Ministry of National Defence, personnel issues, and civil-military relations. This book provides crucial base-line data and evaluation of one of the major participants in an ongoing crisis across the Taiwan Strait that has the potential of involving China and the United States in armed conflict. It examines the danger of a possibly nuclear conflict between China and the United States which would seriously disrupt all of East Asia. It also shows how Taiwan’s defence policies and actions do not match the threat - Taipei needs to develop and pursue realistic policies. This is essential reading for all students of East Asian security and Sino-American relations and of international and security studies in general.

How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.