Addressing the interaction between military operations and the activities of civilian government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during and after conflict, this study traces the development of civil military operations from their origin during World War II as Civil Affairs and military government to the present array of civil military operations. In so doing, it looks closely at the recent cases of Panama, Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Kurdish rescue mission in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Of particular interest is the book's integration of national policy, strategy, and operations as it looks at the interplay between combat operations and their civil, military and political consequences. The outcome of the operations considered here suggests a need to look at the organization and planning of military forces in contemporary conflict as well as the integration of nonmilitary players into the game from the start of operations. The author concludes that the essence of modern conflict can be found in civil military operations.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the relationship between militaries and humanitarians. Largely conducted in post-conflict environments, CIMIC has become a key characteristic of military operations in the twenty-first century. However, the field is mostly understood through stereotype rather than clear, comprehensive analysis. The range and sc

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces, the use of civil affairs forces, the conduct of civil affairs operations, and the coordination with other capabilities contributing to the execution of CMO to achieve unified action. At the strategic, operational and tactical levels and across the full range of military operations, civil-military operations (CMO) are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with “asymmetric” and “irregular” threats. Potential challenges include ethnic and religious conflict, cultural and socioeconomic differences, terrorism and insurgencies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, and sharpening competition/exploitation of dwindling natural resources. Opportunities, conversely, include the integration and comprehensive use of intergovernmental, regional, national, and local governmental and nongovernmental and private sector organizations, which have proliferated in number, variety, and capability. Recent policy initiatives, national security, military strategies, and military doctrine demonstrate a growing appreciation of the need to leverage more nonmilitary instruments of national power, reposed in the interagency process and the private sector, entailing a more holistic, and balance strategy. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint for commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these command, and the Services. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

This book contains unique, firsthand experiences of both the military and civilian actors involved in civil-military interaction processes. It presents lessons learned from a variety of situations, from both NATO-led operations and UN Integrated Missions, and in different geographical areas, such as the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa. Rather than taking the improvisational approach, these lessons learned will enable military commanders and staff and their civilian counterparts in governments, International Organisations and NGOs to come fully prepared for the challenges of today's multifaceted missions. With a better understanding of the mandates and methods of the various civilian and military actors comes greater respect for each other's comparative advantages. With respect comes smoother cooperation. And with that, efficiency gains and enhanced overall mission effectiveness. Each chapter contains solid analysis and advice, specific to the functions found in military organizations, from Intelligence to Personnel and from Logistics to Engineering. Cross-cutting themes like Gender, Human Rights and Corruption are also included in this work that brings together some of the best that practitioners and academics can offer.

Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (HN). At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and during all military operations, CMO are essential to the military instrument to coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats. CMO are applicable at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At the strategic level, CMO focus on larger and long-term issues that may be part of a Department of Defense (DOD) global campaign, or United States Government (USG) reconstruction, economic development initiatives, and stability operations in failing or recovering nations. At the operational level, CMO integrate and synchronize interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities with joint force operations. Often, a civil-military team or civil military operations center (CMOC) may facilitate tactical level CMO among the military, the local populace, NGOs, and IGOs.

This book examines military operations other than war (MOOTW) of the Indonesian military in the post-Suharto period and argues that the twin development of democratic consolidation, marked by ‘stable’ civil–military relations from 2004 to 2014 under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, and internationalization of the military have not yet entirely de-politicized the armed forces. This book shows how peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-terror missions have been reinvented by the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) to adhere to its politico-institutional interests rather than to divert military attention from politics. In contrast with conventional arguments about the rationale of MOOTW in promoting military professionalism, this book provides the first critical analysis of the development of these missions and correlates them with TNI’s concerted effort to preserve territorial command structure – a military network that parallels the civilian bureaucracy down to the village level. The book argues that the military in Indonesia remains domestically political amidst high intensity of international activism. A detailed investigation of civil–military relations in Indonesia, this book will be of interest to scholars in the fields of Southeast Asian studies and Asian politics, and more generally to those interested in civil–military relations, military politics, and MOOTW.