"Breaks new ground in analyzing China's decision to enter the war and its subsequent struggle to hold its own against the world's most powerful nation. Should stand for some time as the standard comprehensive treatment of China in the Korean War". -- William Stueck, author of The Korean War. "Offers provocative insights into Mao's thinking about strategy, tactics, and the human costs of warfare. Highly recommended". -- John Lewis Gaddis, author of The Long Peace.

This book re-visits the history of the Korean War of 1950-1953 from a Chinese perspective, examining Chinese strategy and exploring why China sent three million troops to Korea, in Mao’s words, to “defend the homeland and safeguard the country”—giving rise to what became the war’s common name in China. It also looks into the relatively neglected historical factors which have redefined China’s security concerns and strategic culture. Using newly available sources from China and the former Soviet Union, the book considers how interactive the parameters of defense changes were in a foreign war against Western powers, how flexible Chinese strategy was in the context of its intervention, and how expansive its strategic cultural repertoire was at the crucial moment to “defend the country.” Providing a re-examination of China’s military decisions and strategy evolution, this text narrates the story of successive generations of Chinese leaders and provides a key insight into security issues in China and Northeast Asia today.

China's Road to the Korean War

Between November 1950 and the end of fighting in June 1953, China launched six major offensives against UN forces in Korea. The most important of these began on April 22, 1951, and was the largest Communist military operation of the war. The UN forces put up a strong defense, prevented the capture of the South Korean capital of Seoul, and finally pushed the Chinese back above the 38th parallel. After China's defeat in this epic five-week battle, Mao Zedong and the Chinese leadership became willing to conclude the war short of total victory. China's Battle for Korea offers new perspectives on Chinese decision making, planning, and execution; the roles of command, political control, and technology; and the interaction between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow, while providing valuable insight into Chinese military doctrine and the reasons for the UN's military success.

Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.