In this book an international group of scholars examines China's acceptance and ultimate rejection of Soviet models and practices in economic, cultural, social, and other realms.

Drawing on a wealth of new sources, this work documents the evolving relationship between Moscow and Peking in the twentieth century. Using newly available Russian and Chinese archival documents, memoirs written in the 1980s and 1990s, and interviews with high-ranking Soviet and Chinese eyewitnesses, the book provides the basis for a new interpretation of this relationship and a glimpse of previously unknown events that shaped the Sino-Soviet alliance. An appendix contains translated Chinese and Soviet documents - many of which are being published for the first time. The book focuses mainly on Communist China's relationship with Moscow after the conclusion of the treaty between the Soviet Union and Kuomingtang China in 1945, up until the signing of the treaty between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party in 1950. It also looks at China's relationship with Moscow from 1920 to 1945, as well as developments from 1950 to the present. The author reevaluates existing sources and literature on the topic, and demonstrates that the alliance was reached despite disagreements and distrust on both sides and was not an inevitable conclusion. He also shows that the relationship between the two Communist parties was based on national interest politics, and not on similar ideological convictions.

In 1950 the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance to foster cultural and technological cooperation between the Soviet bloc and the PRC. While this treaty was intended as a break with the colonial past, Austin Jersild argues that the alliance ultimately failed because the enduring problem of Russian imperialism led to Chinese frustration with the Soviets. Jersild zeros in on the ground-level experiences of the socialist bloc advisers in China, who were involved in everything from the development of university curricula, the exploration for oil, and railway construction to piano lessons. Their goal was to reproduce a Chinese administrative elite in their own image that could serve as a valuable ally in the Soviet bloc's struggle against the United States. Interestingly, the USSR's allies in Central Europe were as frustrated by the "great power chauvinism" of the Soviet Union as was China. By exposing this aspect of the story, Jersild shows how the alliance, and finally the split, had a true international dimension.

This comprehensive study of China's Cold War experience reveals the crucial role Beijing played in shaping the orientation of the global Cold War and the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The success of China's Communist revolution in 1949 set the stage, Chen says. The Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crises, and the Vietnam War--all of which involved China as a central actor--represented the only major "hot" conflicts during the Cold War period, making East Asia the main battlefield of the Cold War, while creating conditions to prevent the two superpowers from engaging in a direct military showdown. Beijing's split with Moscow and rapprochement with Washington fundamentally transformed the international balance of power, argues Chen, eventually leading to the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the decline of international communism. Based on sources that include recently declassified Chinese documents, the book offers pathbreaking insights into the course and outcome of the Cold War.

During the twentieth century, 80 percent of all famine victims worldwide died in China and the Soviet Union. In this rigorous and thoughtful study, Felix Wemheuer analyzes the historical and political roots of these socialist-era famines, in which overambitious industrial programs endorsed by Stalin and Mao Zedong created greater disasters than those suffered under prerevolutionary regimes. Focusing on famine as a political tool, Wemheuer systematically exposes how conflicts about food among peasants, urban populations, and the socialist state resulted in the starvation death of millions. A major contribution to Chinese and Soviet history, this provocative analysis examines the long-term effects of the great famines on the relationship between the state and its citizens and argues that the lessons governments learned from the catastrophes enabled them to overcome famine in their later decades of rule.

Russia's foreign policy experience in the first post-Soviet decade was marked by disappointments as well as surprising turns. Expectations that Russia would join the Western powers as an equal partner were frustrated, while relations with the People's Republic of China warmed considerably. Today, Russia's relationship with China is an important component of its overall foreign policy orientation, as the two states - one greatly diminished, the other clearly on the rise - have found themselves sharing an interest in curbing the power of the United States. In analyzing Russia's evolving foreign policy vis-a-vis China, the author takes into account the legacy of Soviet-era precedents; the simultaneous processes of economic policy change and integration into global economic structures; and military relations. By shedding light on the role of political realism, decision makers, and exogenous factors in Russian foreign policy, this analysis of an important bilateral relationship contributes to the larger project of understanding international relations and the dynamics of domestic and foreign policy change.

China and the Soviet Union, first published in 1950, is written by a Chinese former diplomat and university professor, and calls on his many years of experience to provide an even-handed analysis of Sino-Russian relations. It ranges back to 1618 for some much-needed historical background, but the major part of Wu’s examination of the diplomatic relations between the two countries deals with the Soviet Union since 1918.