Cultural Realism is an in-depth study of premodern Chinese strategic thought that has important implications for contemporary international relations theory. In applying a Western theoretical debate to China, Iain Johnston advances rigorous procedures for testing for the existence and influence of "strategic culture." Johnston sets out to answer two empirical questions. Is there a substantively consistent and temporally persistent Chinese strategic culture? If so, to what extent has it influenced China's approaches to security? The focus of his study is the Ming dynasty's grand strategy against the Mongols (1368-1644). First Johnston examines ancient military texts as sources of Chinese strategic culture, using cognitive mapping, symbolic analysis and congruence tests to determine whether there is a consistent grand strategic preference ranking across texts that constitutes a single strategic culture. Then he applies similar techniques to determine the effect of the strategic culture on the strategic preferences of the Ming decision makers. Finally, he assesses the effect of these preferences on Ming policies towards the Mongol "threat." The findings of this book challenge dominant interpretations of traditional Chinese strategic thought. They suggest also that the roots of realpolitik are ideational and not predominantly structural. The results lead to the surprising conclusion that there may be, in fact, fewer cross-national differences in strategic culture than proponents of the "strategic culture" approach think.

The author examines the impact of strategic culture on 21st century China. He contends that the People's Republic of China's security policies and its tendency to use military force are influenced not only by elite understandings of China's own strategic tradition, but also by their understandings of the strategic cultures of other states. Gaining a fuller appreciation for how Chinese strategists view the United States and Japan, our key ally in the Asia-Pacific, will better enable us to assess regional and global security issues.

Examining the major academic and policy debates over China’s rise and related policy issues, this book looks into the motivations and intentions of a rising China. Most of the scholarly works on China’s rise approach the question at a structural level by looking at the international system and the systemic impact on China’s foreign policy. Traditional Realist theorists define China as a revisionist power eager to address wrongs done to them in history, whilst some cultural and historical analyses attest that China’s strategic culture has been offensive despite its weak material capability. Huiyun Feng’s path-breaking contribution to the debate tests these rival hypotheses by examining systematically the beliefs of contemporary Chinese leaders and their strategic interactions with other states since 1949 when the communist regime came to power. The focus is on tracing the historical roots of Chinese strategic culture and its links to the decision-making of six key Chinese leaders via their belief systems. Chinese Strategic Culture will be of interest to students of Chinese politics, foreign policy, strategic theory and international relations in general.

Does strategic thinking on the question of deterrence vary between cultures? Should practitioners assume a common understanding of deterrence regardless of national and cultural differences? Shu Guang Zhang takes on these questions by exploring Sino-American confrontations between 1949 and 1958. Zhang draws on recently declassified U.S. documents and previously inaccessible Chinese Communist Party records to demonstrate that the Chinese and the Americans had vastly different assessments of each other's intentions, interests, threats, strengths, and policies during this period.

Confucianism has shaped a certain perception of Chinese security strategy, symbolized by the defensive, nonaggressive Great Wall. Many believe China is antimilitary and reluctant to use force against its enemies. It practices pacifism and refrains from expanding its boundaries, even when nationally strong. In a path-breaking study traversing six centuries of Chinese history, Yuan-kang Wang resoundingly discredits this notion, recasting China as a practitioner of realpolitik and a ruthless purveyor of expansive grand strategies. Leaders of the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) prized military force and shrewdly assessed the capabilities of China's adversaries. They adopted defensive strategies when their country was weak and pursued expansive goals, such as territorial acquisition, enemy destruction, and total military victory, when their country was strong. Despite the dominance of an antimilitarist Confucian culture, warfare was not uncommon in the bulk of Chinese history. Grounding his research in primary Chinese sources, Wang outlines a politics of power that are crucial to understanding China's strategies today, especially its policy of "peaceful development," which, he argues, the nation has adopted mainly because of its military, economic, and technological weakness in relation to the United States.

The 2013-14 Strategic Asia volume examines the role of nuclear weapons in the grand strategies of key Asian states and assesses the impact of these capabilities—both established and latent—on regional and international stability. In each chapter, a leading expert explores the historical, strategic, and political factors that drive a country's calculations vis-a-vis nuclear weapons and draws implications for American interests.

Strategic Asia 2016-17 examines how the region's major powers view international politics and the use of military force. In each chapter, a leading expert analyzes the ideological and historical sources of a country's strategic culture, how strategic culture informs the thinking of the country's policymakers, and how these understandings lead to decisions about the pursuit of strategic objectives and national power.