An account of the nation's unpreparedness for war and the efforts of General Marshall and his staff to correct it with maximum dispatch. The powers of the Chief of Staff and their origins are described.

In publishing the series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, the Department of the Army has four objectives. The first is to provide the Army itself with an accurate and timely account of its varied activities in mobilizing, organizing, and employing its forces for the conduct of war-an account that will be available to the service schools and to individual members of the Armed Services who wish to extend their professional reading. The second objective is to help enlarge the thoughtful civilian's concept of national security by describing the basic problems of war and the methods of meeting these problems. The third objective is to preserve for the record a well-merited tribute to the devotion and sacrifice of those who served. The fourth objective is to stimulate further research by providing students with a guide to the mountainous accumulation of records produced by the war. The decision to prepare a comprehensive account of military activities was made early in the war. Trained historians were assigned to the larger units of the Army and the War Department to initiate the work of research, analysis, and writing. The results of their work, supplemented by additional research in records not readily available during the war, are presented in this series. The general plan provides for subseries dealing with the War Department, the Army Air, Ground, and Service Forces, the technical services, and the theaters of operations. This division conforms to the organization of the Army during World War II and, though involving some overlapping in subject matter, has the advantage of presenting a systematic account of developments in each major field of responsibility as well as the points of view of the particular commands. The plan also includes volumes on such topics as statistics, order of battle, military training, the Women's Army Corps, and other subjects that transcend the limits of studies focused on an agency or command. The whole project is oriented toward an eventual summary and synthesis. No claim is made that it will constitute a final history. Many years will pass before the record of the war can be fully analyzed and appraised. This, the first volume on the Office of the Chief of Staff in World War II, highlights a significant and unprecedented preparation for war. It covers a period when longheaded military leadership and direction were needed before the people had been aroused to expression of their will, a people not yet aware of the dangers that lay ahead. More specifically, it tells of the contributions to national security that were made during the prewar period by the Chief of Staff and his immediate assistants. It is a history of military famine followed by plenty. It is a history of mistakes made as well as successes accomplished and of vision, foresight, forbearance, and selflessness. It is a history of deepening confidence, shared by the President, the Congress, and the people, in the integrity and ability of a leader who, although he did not aspire to greatness, was all the greater by reason thereof. During the period here depicted the Chief of Staff built so well and so strongly that the tragedy of Pearl Harbor did not shake the confidence of the nation. Mark Skinner Watson, the author of this volume, was an artillery officer in World War I, a war correspondent during the recent conflict, and a student of military affairs for many years. His dispatches to the Baltimore Sun won the Pulitzer Prize for International Correspondence in 1945.

An account of the nation's unpreparedness for war and the efforts of General Marshall and his staff to correct it with maximum dispatch. The powers of the Chief of Staff and their origins are described.

This volume deals with strategic planning in the midwar era from January 1943 through the summer of 1944. This is the story of the hopes, fears, struggles, frustrations, and triumphs of the Army strategic planners coming to grips with the problems of the offensive phase of coalition warfare. Basic to this story is the account of planning by General George C. Marshall and his advisers in the great debate on European strategy which followed the Allied landings in North Africa and continued to the penetration of the German frontier in September 1944. During this period the great international conferences from Casablanca in January 1943 to the second Quebec in September 1944 were held and the Allies formulated the grand strategy of military victory. The volume follows the plans, issues, and decisions to the end of the summer of 1944, when the problems of winning the war began to come up against the challenges of victory and peace, and a new era was beginning for the Army Chief of Staff and his advisers. Military soldiers, veterans, especially World War II veterans adn their families, and students studying World War II may enjoy reading this primary source document that accounts the leadership and strategy during World War Two years 1943-1944. Related products: United States Army in World War 2, War Department, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00056-3 Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2010: Portraits & Biographical Sketches of the United States Army's Senior Officer is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00538-7 Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army: Portraits & Biographical Sketches 2010 is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00537-9 World War II resources collection can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/world...